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The future of Afghanistan and its neighboring Central Asian countries is uncertain as 
U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces prepare to draw down and transition 
to training, advising, and assisting Afghan National Forces. What are the critical threats 
to regional stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia post 2014? What can the U.S. 
government and military do to promote stability in this region? This thesis investigates 
these questions by comparing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, along 
with the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, which caused social, political, and economic 
upheaval, to possible causes of instability in Afghanistan and Central Asia post-2014.  
This thesis finds that the sudden and complete loss of financial assistance from 
Moscow in 1992 led to the collapse of the Afghan government and turmoil in Central 
Asia. Furthermore, similar conditions exist today and could be exacerbated if the United 
States follows a strategy of total disengagement from the region. Therefore, the U.S. 
government and military needs to maintain a presence in the region and should continue 
to focus on capacity building, particularly in the areas of border security, civil society 
building, and economic stabilization.  
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On September 30, 2014, the United States signed a bilateral security agreement 
(BSA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signed a status of forces 
agreement (SOFA) with the newly formed Afghan Government of National Unity, 
effectively ending major combat operations in December 2014 and stipulating the 
presence of a small force for training, advising, and counterterrorism missions.1 Despite 
this landmark agreement, the decision to reduce U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan 
and the impact of doing so on the region remain hotly debated. For example, a November 
2013 report drafted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) 
presents an optimistic account of post-2014 Afghanistan. Specifically, it contends that its 
military is the best trained and largest in the area.
2
 Additionally, this account claims that 
the Taliban are a minor influence that cannot undo the cultural change and modernization 
that has already begun as a result of 13 years of NATO and international influence; they, 
therefore, will not be a significant threat to Afghan or regional security.
3
 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the same report further contends, 
…that Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, that no 
regime will be able to survive without substantial external support, and 
that the Afghan military is unprepared to carry on alone—accordingly, it 
contends, changes brought about by the decade of foreign presence will 
vanish into a ‘black hole.’4  
Militants, drug traffickers, and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) will have 
increased freedom of movement across the porous borders of Central Asia with no U.S. 
                                                 
1 Margherita Stancati, and Nathan Hodge, “Afghanistan Signs Security Pact with U.S., NATO,” The 
Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2014.. http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-afghan-bilateral-security-
agreement-signed-1412076436. 
2 Central Asia/Caspian Sea Basin Region after the Withdrawal of U.S. and NATO Troops from 
Afghanistan, National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Roundtable Conference, Washington, DC 





or NATO military forces to apply pressure and disrupt operations. As a result, instability 
is more likely to occur both within Afghanistan and with its neighbors. 
With these debates over the future of Afghanistan and its neighboring Central 
Asian countries in mind, this thesis seeks to investigate the following questions: What are 
the critical threats to regional stability that Afghanistan and Central Asia faces post 2014? 
Is it likely the Taliban and other regionally destabilizing jihadists will re-emerge in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia more broadly? What can the U.S. government and military 
do to promote stability in this region? 
In order to investigate these questions, this thesis posits that valuable lessons can 
be learned from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and applied to the 
current efforts of U.S. and NATO forces to disengage from Afghanistan. Specifically, 
this thesis will compare the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and its support 
of a communist government from 1989–1991, to U.S. strategies for withdrawal in 2014. 
What steps can NATO and the United States take to prevent a similar collapse of the 
government that occurred in 1992? Furthermore, if Afghanistan’s stability is also linked 
to key Central Asian states, what can the U.S. government and military do to promote 
stability in these countries? 
Looking back, the Soviet Union took several measures aimed at ensuring Afghan 
stability following its withdrawal in 1989. It installed an Afghan government that was 
sympathetic to its interests and, despite being disjointed and unpopular, was able to stay 
in power after Soviet military forces withdrew. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also 
infused Afghanistan with massive amounts of economic assistance aimed at maintaining 
a functioning economy, paying the Afghan military, and buying off political foes. The 
Soviets also created Afghan forces that proved to be both competent and capable of 
handling domestic security concerns on their own after the Soviets withdrawal. However, 
when Soviet economic assistance abruptly stopped in 1991, the government no longer 
had money to pay salaries, buy off tribal militias, or fund the economy.  
Today, President Ghani’s administration faces many of the same challenges as the 
Najibullah regime did in 1991, including corruption, competing internal political interest, 
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credibility issues, dependence on foreign aid, and attacks from violent extremist 
organizations. Economically, Afghanistan is also in a similar position to that following 
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. As then, Afghanistan is utterly dependent on foreign 
assistance. Furthermore, Afghanistan is wracked with social tensions and inequalities 
based on ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and gender. However, the last decade has seen some 
improvements in civil society building. It is also possible that Afghanistan’s security 
forces will prove capable of independently defending Afghanistan against domestic 
threats, provided aid and assistance do not cease. 
Further comparisons can be drawn between the effects of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse on key Central Asian states and the substantial withdrawal of U.S. and NATO 
forces in 2014, accompanied by the possible cessation of financial aid to the region. The 
rapid collapse of the Soviet Union placed inexperienced leaders in power who resorted to 
the form of governance with which they were familiar, the Soviet model. However, the 
Soviet model did not provide the tools and resources of state building that these newly 
independent states required. Socially, the region experienced an identity crisis as it 
transitioned from being part of the Soviet Union to newly independent states. In some 
cases, new nationalist identities did not correspond with the multi-ethnic composition of 
these countries. In addition, Central Asia was one of the poorest regions in the Soviet 
Union and declined further with its collapse. Security in the region was also deeply 
affected by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a bloody civil war broke out in 
Tajikistan, in addition to several spates of violence in the Ferghana valley, which shares 
borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the three states that are the focus of 
this thesis.  
Somewhat similarly, Central Asia also faces several challenges to stability after 
2014. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan now have over 20 years of experience 
functioning as independent countries; however, many of the lessons learned have been 
neither progressive nor productive. Economically, Central Asia has high levels of poverty 
and unemployment and considerable economic challenges. Corruption continues to be a 
considerable problem that goes hand-in hand with these countries’ undemocratic 
practices. Socially, these countries face sub-state loyalties based on ethnicity and 
4 
regionalism. Central Asian security will probably experience increases of violence as 
coalition forces draw down from Afghanistan, but the reasons for violence will likely 
have as much to do with competition over natural resources, illicit trafficking, and a 
frustrated populace as from VEOs in the region. 
By comparing the conditions under which the Soviet Union withdrew from 
Afghanistan in 1989 and Afghanistan’s subsequent loss of financial and military support 
brought about by the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, this thesis will find that that the 
biggest point of failure leading to the collapse of the Afghan government in 1992 and the 
political, social, and economic turmoil that ensued in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan was the loss of financial support from Moscow that allowed these regimes to 
buy off political competitors and keep the economy afloat. All Central Asian countries 
were dependent on Moscow for economic stability and military assistance; the Soviet 
Union did not take steps aimed at creating these states’ self-sufficiency. When the money 
dried up, so did the influence and stability it created in the region. This observation offers 
important clues for how the U.S. government and U.S. forces should approach stabilizing 
the region moving forward. While financial aid may be necessary in the short run, long 
term success requires building the capacity of the region politically, economically, 
socially, in addition to building their security forces.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will use a controlled case study comparison of the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 in 
order to gain insights into U.S. and NATO plans to leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014. 
Specifically, this thesis will investigate effects of both the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1989 and the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse on the political, social, 
economic and military health of Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, the thesis will trace the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
on the Central Asian states, including specifically the effects on the governments, 
economies, security forces and societies of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 
These three countries were chosen because of their immediate or close proximity to 
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Afghanistan, their similar internal struggles, their shared borders with the volatile 
Ferghana Valley, and the conflicts that have occurred between these states over resources 
and border security.   
By analyzing these cases, the intent is to investigate if there are applicable lessons 
for the U.S. and NATO to be learned from the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
1989, and if so, what pitfalls both the U.S. and NATO could avoid by learning from the 
Soviet Union’s decisions.  
In examining both the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the U.S. NATO withdrawal 
at the end of 2014, this thesis will look specifically at the following factors of stability: 
governance, economic development, security force capability, and social well-being. 
Finally, this thesis will conclude with recommendations for actions that the U.S. 
government could take to help mitigate instability in the region, including the use of U.S. 
forces in security cooperation programs designed to train and equip counterterrorist 
forces, border security programs, disaster relief and emergency response, and 
humanitarian assistance programs in conjunction with other U.S. government led efforts. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II will discuss the effects of the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989 and the USSR’s 1991 collapse on Afghanistan, specifically, its 
effects on political, economic, social, and security conditions that led to instability and 
eventual civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Chapter III will discuss the effects of the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and collapse of the Soviet Union on the governance, 
economics, security and social dynamics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 
Chapter IV examines the current political stability, economic conditions, social concerns, 
and security forces’ capabilities in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Finally, Chapter V 
highlights lessons learned from the previous chapters followed by possible trajectories in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia after 2014, based on current conditions. The chapter 




mitigate destabilizing factors, along with the relevance of the region to U.S. security and 
importance of maintaining some type of persistent military, diplomatic, and economic 






II. THE IMPACT ON AFGHANISTAN FROM THE SOVIET 
WITHDRAWAL AND SOVIET COLLAPSE 
The withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, 
particularly U.S. forces, has raised numerous questions regarding the immediate and 
long-term stability of the country. However, uncertainty concerning the stability and 
security of Afghanistan is not new. From 1989 through 1992, Afghanistan experienced 
two significant transformative events. The first was the Soviet Union’s military 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the second was the dissolution of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the end of 1991 and Afghanistan’s subsequent loss 
of financial and military aid. These two events led to the collapse of the Soviet-backed 
Najibullah government, the descent into civil war, and the eventual rise of the Taliban 
regime and Al Qaeda safe haven.  
This chapter investigates the impact of the Soviet Union’s complete military 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and its end of military and financial aid in 1992 
with the aim of comparing the conditions leading to Afghanistan’s collapse in 1992 to 
those that may occur after NATO and U.S. troops withdrawal at the end of 2014. This 
chapter begins with a brief background of why and how the Soviets invaded and occupied 
Afghanistan. Then it provides an analysis of the decision and preparations of a Soviet 
withdrawal, including Soviet actions taken after the withdrawal. The chapter concludes 
by focusing on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the developments that occurred 
within Afghanistan as a result.  
This chapter finds that the loss of direct military intervention by a superpower 
considerably altered the social and political landscape of Afghanistan. However, the end 
of superpower sponsorship due to the Soviet Union’s collapse was more significant to the 
viability of Afghanistan and directly led to the collapse of the Najibullah regime. As will 
be argued, these findings are significant for NATO and U.S. plans to withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and they offer insights into how a second collapse of the government could 
be postponed or even avoided.  
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A. SOVIET INVASION 
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was established on April 27, 
1978, when a small group of Soviet-trained Afghans seized control of the government 
and installed communist Nur M. Taraki as president of the new socialist state.5 President 
Taraki proposed a broad range of reforms from land redistribution to restructuring 
Afghanistan’s social structure as a means of bringing the country in line with communist 
and Soviet principles. Taraki’s policies found some support among some city inhabitants, 
but failed to gain the backing of the overall population who found the changes contrary to 
Afghan norms and tribal customs. Simultaneously, the Communist party was split into 
two factions that spent more time fighting one another than trying to promote 
Communism. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s prime minister, assassinated 
Taraki and seized power. Amin’s rule was less successful than Taraki’s, and the Soviets 
watched in fear as the new communist state spun out of control.6  
Following the assassination of Taraki, the Soviet leadership decided direct 
military action was necessary to stabilize the situation. From December 25–27, 1979, the 
Soviets successfully executed a coup de main in Afghanistan that took control of the 
government. The Soviets quickly seized major cities, centers of power, and radio stations, 
in addition to executing President Amin, and installing a communist exile, Babrak 
Karmal, as the country’s new leader.7 The Soviets successfully consolidated power in the 
cities, but were unable to control the countryside, and a rebellion followed. Sovietologist 
Lester Grau describes the rebellion’s origins: “Religious leaders proclaimed jihad against 
the Communist regime and bands of Mujahideen took to the field to defend the faith.”8 
                                                 
5 Paul Dibb, “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons to Be Learned?” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 64, no. 5 ( 2010): 496, doi:10.1080/10357718.2010.513366. 
6 Ibid.   
7 Lester W. Grau, and Voennai͡ a akademii͡ a imeni M.V. Frunze, The Bear Went over the Mountain: 
Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), xviii.  
8 Lester Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007):  236, doi:10.1080/13518040701373080. 
9 
A protracted guerrilla war began in the months following the invasion. Soviet 
military leadership recommended withdrawal, but political leaders decided to increase 
troop strength from three to over five divisions.9 The Soviet Union’s plan was to stabilize 
the country and withdraw the bulk of Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCSOF) 
within three years.10 The initial military plan aimed to emplace garrisons along main 
routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites; push Afghan forces into the countryside 
to battle the resistance; provide logistic, air, and intelligence support to Afghan forces; 
maintain minimal interface between Soviet occupation forces and the local populace; and 
strengthen the Afghan forces so that Soviet forces could withdraw once the resistance 
was defeated.11 However, the 50,000 Soviet combat troops that initially entered 
Afghanistan were not organized, trained, or equipped for the insurgency that followed the 
invasion.12  
The Soviets did not anticipate the strength of the resistance and became involved 
in a protracted conflict that lasted over nine years. Ultimately, of the 642,000 Soviets 
who served during the war, 14,453 were killed, and 53,753 were wounded or injured.13 
These numbers do not include an additional 115,308 that suffered from infectious 
hepatitis and 31,080 that contracted typhoid fever.14 The Soviets also suffered heavy 
losses in military equipment, including 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 
armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces and mortars, 510 engineering vehicles, 
and 11,369 trucks.15  
                                                 
9 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 237. 
10 Dibb, “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan,” 496.  
11 Grau and Frunze, The Bear Went over the Mountain, xix.   
12 Mark E. Calvert, “Withdrawal from Conflict: Historical Lessons for the Future” (Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air War College, 2008), 10, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA540263 
13 Lester W. Grau, and William A. Jorgensen, “Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: 
The Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya,” Journal of Special Operations 7, no. 1 
(Winter 2007): 65, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498077 
14 Grau and Frunze, The Bear Went over the Mountain, xiv.   
15 Ibid, xix. 
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B. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN 
On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet convoy crossed the bridge from 
Afghanistan into Uzbekistan and finalized the Soviet military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan after nine years of war. The Soviet decision to withdraw stemmed from 
internal political and economic changes which resulted in the Soviet Union reevaluating 
its national interests with respect to Afghanistan.16 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power on 
March 11, 1985, and imposed a one year deadline to make a military solution work in 
Afghanistan. This policy decision resulted in 1985 being the bloodiest year of fighting in 
the war.17 Ultimately, the Soviets were unable to decisively destroy the mujahedeen 
without drastically increasing the number of Soviet troops. General Mikhail Zaitsev, top 
Soviet commander in Afghanistan, reported a Soviet military victory required closure of 
the Pakistan border and at least 250,000 extra troops, both which he described as 
unrealistic.18 
In October 1985, Gorbachev recommended to the Politburo that they endorse 
Zaitsev’s strategy of pushing for the earliest possible withdrawal from Afghanistan.19 In 
Gorbachev’s first address to the 27th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union on February 26, 1986, he referred to Afghanistan as “a bleeding wound” and 
signaled his intent to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan.20 The idea that the war 
could not be won was shared by politicians and military leaders alike. In November 1986, 
Marshal of the Soviet Army, Sergei Akhromeyev, told the Politburo,  
 
                                                 
16 Calvert, “Withdrawal from Conflict,” 22. 
17 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 237. 
18 It should be noted that from 1985–1986 the Soviet armed forces numbered 5,130,000 of which 
1,991,000 were ground forces and this does not include reservist. This number illustrates that the Soviets 
had the military forces to conduct a troop increase but decided against doing so. Numbers were taken from, 
“The Soviet Union,” The Military Balance 86, no. 1 (January 1986): 36–37; Jonathan Steele, “A Tale of 
Two Retreats: Afghan Transition in Historical Perspective,” Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (September 
2013): 308. 
19 Steele, “A Tale of Two Retreats,” 308. 
20 Ibid., 307. 
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After seven years in Afghanistan, there is not one square kilometre [sic] 
left untouched by a boot of a Soviet soldier. But as soon as they leave a 
place, the enemy returns and restores it all back the way it used to be. We 
have lost this battle.21  
Even in the face of such realism, Soviet forces would not begin to withdraw in significant 
numbers until May 1988. The Soviets wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan on their 
terms and allow time for the Afghan government time to develop a strategy of national 
reconciliation that involved incorporating the mujahedeen into the government.22  
On April 14, 1988, after several years of stalled negotiations, a series of 
agreements to end the fighting in Afghanistan were signed, including three bilateral 
agreements between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an additional 
“Declaration of International Guarantees” between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.23 Collectively, these documents were referred to as the Afghan Geneva Accords. 
One of the provisions from the Accords provided two phased timetables for the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The timeline stipulated, “One half of the troops will be 
withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within 
nine months.”24 However, the Soviets did not tie the timetable to specific military and 
political conditions.25  
The Soviets informed Afghan leadership to prepare for withdrawal before the 
decision was made public. In March 1985, Afghan leader Babrak Karmal visited Moscow 
for the funeral of Konstantin Cherneko, and Gorbachev instructed him to alter his 
domestic policies and include “progressive forces” because Soviet troops could not stay 
indefinitely.26 Karmal was unable to make progress on the changes envisioned by 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 308.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Rosanne Klass, “Afghanistan: The Accords,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5 (July 1988): 922, 
doi:10.2307/20043571. 
24 Ibid., 923. 
25 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 253. 
26 Steele, “A Tale of Two Retreats,” 307. 
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Moscow and was replaced by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah in May 1986.27 Najibullah 
would be in charge of implementing national reforms to open negotiations with 
opposition movements to create a more inclusive government.  
Najibullah, aware he was on a timeline to produce results, began to implement 
political changes. In November 1986, Najibullah introduced a new constitution that 
introduced a multi-party system and an Islamic legal system, and in December of that 
same year, he announced a national reconciliation policy (NRP) that proposed a cease 
fire, dialogue with opposition leaders, and a possible coalition government.28 The NRP 
was based on four principles: immediate cessation of hostilities, meeting of local leaders 
from all sides at a round table, creation of a transitional government, and the holding of 
free general elections.29 Najibullah also worked to be perceived as more Islamic. In 
November 1987, he introduced a new constitution in which he changed the country’s 
name to the Republic of Afghanistan while convening a Loya Jirga—council of tribal 
chiefs, village elders, and other political/social leaders across Afghanistan—to approve 
the new constitution and his assumption as president.30 In 1988, Najibullah attempted to 
gain popular support by changing the name of the Afghan Communist Party from the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to the Hizb-I Watan (Homeland 
Party) and allowing non-Communists into the government, although never in positions of 
authority.31 
The NRP was a drastic shift in state policy and did have some success in fighting 
the insurgency and state building. Having failed to form a strong centralized government, 
the NRP worked on creating a decentralized state through arrangements between the 
central government and individual regional actors, with local autonomy guaranteed in 
                                                 
27 Alex. Marshall, Phased Withdrawal, Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction, Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2006, 2, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/ca/06%2829%29AM.pdf 
28 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 244–246. 
29 Marshall, Phased Withdrawal, 2. 
30 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 246. 
31 Ibid. 
13 
return for ceasefires.32 Ethnic minorities that had been excluded during previous attempts 
benefited from the changes in policy. Two such groups were the Hazara and Uzbeks of 
northern Afghanistan. The 40,000 armed men of the Jauzjani Uzbek militia led by Abdul 
Rashid Dostum proved to be one of the fiercest and most competent forces that fought on 
behalf of the regime.33 In 1989, at the time of Soviet withdrawal, Dostum’s forces were 
relabeled as the 53
rd
 Division and answered directly to Najibullah while serving as the 
regime’s sole mobile reserve in 1989.34  
The implementation of the NRP also had significant shortcomings. When the 
Soviets withdrew in 1989, the chief executive department (Najibullah and four deputies) 
had two Parchami, one Khalqi, and two non-party members; compared to the Supreme 
Soviet time period prior to Najibullah when the department had 14 Parchami, six Khalqi, 
and one non-party member.35 Najibullah had already begun to consolidate his power base 
by reducing the number of personnel with potential opposition. The success of the NRP 
would not be realized until the Soviets withdrew. 
In conjunction with national reconciliation efforts, the Soviets provided economic 
and humanitarian aid and did what they could to build up, train, and equip Afghan forces 
prior to the Soviet withdrawal. Realizing the need for a stable urban population, the 
Soviet Union established a ground and air supply corridor to Kabul and Kandahar in 
1988. The primary cargo was flour delivered in 15 to 20 daily transport aircraft loads that 
amounted to 15,000 tons of flour a month.36  
In addition to allowing time for political consolidation, the Soviets also took steps 
to strengthen the Afghan’s military. The Soviets handed over enormous amounts of 
munitions, weapons, and other equipment to Afghan soldiers and provided a small 
contingent of advisors to help with training, logistics, and airstrikes to help the Afghan 
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government. In all, the Soviets transferred 184 garrisons’ worth of equipment valued at 
699 million rubles and transferred government equipment worth 98.3 million rubles.37 
The Soviets ensured that the Afghan armed forces had at least a three-month reserve of 
ammunition, fuel and food. The three-month reserves constituted over 28,200 tons of 
ammunition, 65,270 tons of vehicle and aviation fuel, 30,000 tons of food, 3990 vehicles, 
538 indirect fire weapons, 14,443 small arms, and 1,706 rocket launchers.38 In addition to 
transferring goods and materiel, the Soviets provided trainers to educate Afghans on 
unfamiliar equipment and made sure it was in working order. 
Alongside military aid, the Soviets continued to provide economic assistance to 
Kabul at around $300 million per month or between $3 billion to $4 billion annually.39 
Soviet assistance, aid and supplies were aimed to stabilize the Afghan government, 
ensure the Afghans that they had the resources available to handle security on their own, 
and to assure them that the Soviet Union would not abandon them.  
Soviet forces began withdrawing from Afghanistan in earnest on May 15, 1988. 
One of the concerns during the withdrawal was the susceptibility of Soviet forces to 
guerrilla attacks. A response to this concern was securing safe passage of convoys by 
arranging cease fires and hiring mujahedeen groups and local militias for security.40 Of 
particular concern were the Tajik mujahedeen leader Ahmed Shah Massoud and his 
forces which occupied large portions along the Soviet route. The Soviets had arranged a 
cease fire with Massoud as early as 1983 that allowed both sides time to consolidate and 
rebuild their forces.41 This initial ceasefire paved the way for a temporary cease fire in 
late 1988 and early 1989 between Massoud and Soviet General Valentin Varennikov.42 
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However, the ceasefire was short lived and was broken by the Soviets at the request of 
the DRA president, Najibullah.  
The Soviets were not the only forces to arrange cease fires or negotiate with the 
mujahedeen or local militias. The DRA government brokered agreements with many of 
the same factions, particularly after the withdrawal was completed. Ultimately, the 
Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan was systematic and aimed to provide 
humanitarian, political and military support. Grau argues: 
When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a coordinated, 
deliberate, professional manner, leaving behind a functioning government, 
an improved military and an advisory and economic effort insuring the 
continued viability of the government. The withdrawal was based on a 
coordinated diplomatic, economic and military plan permitting Soviet 
forces to withdraw in good order and the Afghan government to survive.43 
Despite these efforts, the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union ended support for the 
Najibullah regime.  
C. 1989–1992 SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TO SOVIET COLLAPSE 
The Soviet-installed Afghan government did not collapse immediately after the 
Soviet withdrawal, surviving for over three more years. Soviet efforts to prepare and train 
the Afghan security forces, along with reforms by the NRP, continued Soviet economic 
and military assistance, lack of unity within the opposition mujahedeen, and Najibullah’s 
ability to manipulate and exploit divisions within the opposition were a few of the factors 
that contributed to the short-term survival of the regime. However, it was the same 
dependency on Soviet economic assistance and the use of the military that ultimately 
undermined the regime. 
On the political front, Najibullah tried to capitalize on the Soviet withdrawal to 
claim that Afghanistan was a self-governing nation. In a televised meeting with tribal 
leaders shortly after Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah stated, “We only took help from one 
infidel [Russia]. The other side has taken help from several infidels [United States, 
                                                 
43 Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 235. 
16 
Britain, and China].”44 Najibullah’s claims were able to persuade some local fighters that 
the jihad was no longer necessary and were able to financially persuade others to stop 
fighting.45 Many of the mujahedeen had gone home after the Soviet withdrawal and 
Najibullah hired other mujahedeen to help guard the Afghan military’s lines of 
communication and facilities.46 Najibullah paid others not to fight.47 Initially, Najibullah 
successfully capitalized on the collapse of Soviet support and divisions within the 
mujahedeen to create an unstable peace in the country. However, not all factions were 
ready to lay down their arms.  
When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the Afghan military consisted of 329,000 
men, 1,568 tanks, 828 armored personnel carriers, over 4,880 artillery pieces, and 140 
mixed rotary and fixed wing aircraft.
48
 Moscow also had left behind about 300 advisers, 
and the Kabul regime had the support of a 10,000 strong presidential guard and various 
militias, including General Dostum’s 53rd division.49 Moreover, the Soviets had signed 
over a battalion of SCUD missiles that carried over 2,000 pounds of explosives and could 
be fired up to 600 kilometers.50 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) reported that Afghanistan was the fifth largest importer of arms from 1986–1990, 
and that number does not include weapons provided to the resistance.51  
The first real test for the Afghan military occurred at the battle of Jalalabad 
between March and May 1989. The local garrison, supported by 100–120 daily close air 
support sorties and SCUD missiles, successfully repelled an attack of nearly 10,000 
mujahedeen.52 The battle resulted in an estimated 3,000 mujahedeen casualties, in 
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addition to increasing the Afghan army’s morale.53 The mujahedeen further lost 
credibility when they executed 70 captured Afghan soldiers and made the army more 
determined to resist.54 The victory, along with this atrocity, gave the Najibullah regime a 
much needed boost of legitimacy.  
The first sign that the Afghan military could successfully conduct a large-scale 
offensive operation occurred in April of 1990. The Afghan government had decided to 
seize the heavily fortified mujahedeen stronghold of Paghman, which had been a safe 
haven for the mujahedeen since 1985 and was reinforced with numerous obstacles and 
weapon systems. The fighting lasted over two months, and General Dostum’s 53rd 
Division led the critical second wave of fighting supported by tanks, 3,300 aerial bombs, 
and 66,000 shells.55 Ultimately, Afghan government forces suffered 51 dead and 330 
wounded to 440 mujahedeen dead and 1,000 wounded.56  
These military victories, however, were overshadowed by rebellion, secret 
alliances, and failures in the NRP. In March 1990, the Defense Minister, General Tanai, 
and other Khalq officers joined the mujahedeen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in a coup 
d’état, nearly killing Najibullah on March 6, 1990.57 In response, Najibullah abolished 
the Defense Council, abandoned the structure of the Higher Command Staff, and began 
appointing his own factions to power, the very thing the Soviet advisers had tried to 
prevent.58 Desertion within the Afghan military rose by 60 percent in 1991 from the 
previous year due to food shortages, lack of logistical support, and months of unpaid 
wages in many units.
59
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Ethnic tensions developed due to Najibullah’s policy of appointing fellow 
Pashtuns in positions of influence in the government, militias, and the military. One of 
Najibullah’s most critical miscalculations was his attempt to exert Pashtun control over 
northern troops and militias. In February 1992, Najibullah tried to replace the Tajik 
General Abdul Momin with a Pashtun and reduce the influence of Uzbek militia leader 
Rashid Dostum.
60
 The attempt failed and both men revolted and formed an alliance with 
the Tajik anti-Soviet mujahedeen commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud. Political coalitions 
shifted from Islam versus communism to Pashtun versus non-Pashtun ideologies.
61
  
Economic conditions, which had been in continual decline since the Soviet 
withdrawal, also undermined the Afghan government.
62
 Afghanistan’s only export, 
natural gas, had deteriorated since 1984 and dried out by 1989.
63
 Between 1988 and 
1990, the Kabul government doubled the amount of printed currency in circulation in 
order to meet its obligations.
64
 Lack of fuel led to the air force being grounded in January 
1992.
65
 These economic hardships were compounded by Boris Yeltsin’s 1991 decision to 
end “direct financial and material support to Najibullah.”66 Yeltsin’s decision also meant 
that Moscow would not meet its annual commitment to supply 230,000 tons of food to 
Afghanistan, which further exacerbated by a poor wheat harvest. 
67
  
The Afghan government had mixed results with the various militias who had 
become the primary recipients of the NRP. General Dostum’s Uzbek militia had fought 
bravely in several battles and others were entrusted with providing security; from 1989-
1990, over three-quarters of the forces guarding Herat and Shindand in the north were 
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tribal militias and not Afghan government soldiers.68 The Afghan government had 
become dependent on the militias to provide security. As the dependence on the militias 
grew, the government felt compelled to meet their demands for sophisticated weaponry, 
including tanks, armored personnel carriers, rocket batteries, and heavy guns.69 The 
increased economic and material assistance from the government empowered the militias 
to act above the law as they engaged in various crimes and increased their political 
clout.70 Two months after Dostum’s defection, non-Pashtun forces from the north and 
Pashtun forces from the south rushed to capture Kabul.71 The mujahedeen victory was 
the beginning of a new chapter in the Afghan civil war. 
D. SOVIET COLLAPSE 
In April 1992—almost four months after Soviet economic assistance stopped—
the mujahedeen succeeded in toppling the Najibullah government and creating an Islamic 
State of Afghanistan. The new political leaders were Hezb-e Islami under Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, Jamiat-e Islami under Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud 
(both ethnic Tajiks), along with Rashid Dostum’s Jumbish-e Milli, Rasul Sayaf’s Ittehad-
e Islami, and Shi’ite Hezb-e Wahdat.72 Initially the official government was comprised of 
Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami supported by the Tajik Massoud and secular Uzbek Dostum. 
The opposition consisted of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, who advocated for Pashtun 
supremacy.73 However, each of these parties’ policies varied according to their own 
personal interests to include ethnic, tribal, and linguistic affiliations; the areas in which 
each of the parties held influence; and each party’s perception of what powers the new 
Islamic state would have. The inability or unwillingness of these groups to unite left the 
new government weak and ineffective.  
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E. RISE OF THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA 
Alongside the rise of mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan, a band of Sunni Pashtuns 
that came largely from refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border emerged that later 
became known as the Taliban.74 The Taliban’s promise of restoring order and security 
was appealing in the presence of a complete social breakdown and lawlessness.75 The 
disorder and violence that occurred as the major factions battled for power presented an 
opportunity for the Taliban to emerge as a legitimate and capable force to bring stability 
to Afghanistan.  
In November 1994, the Taliban seized Kandahar, expanded their power base, and 
gained additional followers. The Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, donned the 
sacred cloak of the Prophet Muhammad and decreed that he was the “Leader of the 
Faithful.”76 In February 1995, the Taliban forced Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami to flee their 
stronghold in Charasyab, 25 kilometers south of Kabul, leaving their robust arsenal 
behind.77 The Taliban now had a large cache of weapons, gained new recruits through 
their victory, and had a stronghold near Kabul. In 1996, the Taliban forced the non-
Pashtun Rabbani government to flee Kabul and by 1997 they controlled 95 percent of the 
country.78 The remaining resistance was comprised of mainly non-Pashtuns including the 
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras that formed the anti-Taliban coalition known as the 
Northern Alliance.  
The Taliban forged alliances with other powerful groups. One of the most 
prominent non-Pashtun groups was Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden was 
an Arab from Saudi Arabia and had fought alongside some of the mujahedeen against the 
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Soviets. Bin Laden and his supporters returned in May of 1996 after being expelled from 
Sudan. Bin Laden had a global agenda, whereas the Taliban were more focused on 
Afghanistan; the competing agendas often put the two at odds. Researcher Matt Waldman 
states, “The Taliban did not invite Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan, and its relationship 
with the terrorist group was strained, influenced by Pakistan and highly dependent on 
personal relations between the group’s respective leaders.”79 Despite this uneasy alliance, 
Al Qaeda reinforced the Taliban de facto governance of Afghanistan.  
Another group that trained and ultimately aligned with both the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In the wake of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, revivalist mullahs and imams formed groups in conjunction with 
Afghan war veterans and martial arts clubs to protect neighborhoods as a response to the 
breakdown of social order and rise of crime from the collapse.80 One such group, the 
Adolat party, which is Islamically based, wanted more than just to restore order. Its 
leaders, Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namangan, demanded that Karimov annul the 
parliament and create an Islamist government.81 The members were eventually forced out 
of Uzbekistan in 1992 and fought alongside the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the 
Tajik civil war. The IMU had originally sought safe haven among Massoud’s elements. 
However, around 1998-199 the Uzbek government pressed Tajikistan to exile the IMU 
and put pressure on Massoud not to harbor them. Namangan of the IMU later formed a 
loose alliance with Mullah Omar and Osama Bin laden that provided the IMU sanctuary 
in exchange for fighting against the Northern Alliance.82 This alliance resulted in 
transnational ties across borders with Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. 
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The collapse of the Afghan government and the chaos that ensued were not 
confined within Afghanistan’s borders. Many Afghans were internally displaced as they 
sought to escape the fighting, and hundreds of thousands became refugees in bordering 
countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that by 
September 10, 2001, there were an estimated 3,623,000 Afghan refugees: 2,000,000 in 
Pakistan, 1,482,000 in Iran, 800 in Uzbekistan, 15,400 in Tajikistan, and 8,300 in 
Kyrgyzstan.83  
Coinciding with Afghanistan’s mass population migration was the rise of Islamic 
extremism in the country. The Taliban permitted several Islamic extremists groups, such 
as Al Qaeda and the IMU, to train and recruit within Afghanistan. The creation of a 
terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan affected regional and international security, eventually 
culminating with the September 11 attacks against the United States.  
F. RISE OF THE DRUG TRADE 
Afghanistan has been one of the world’s leading producers of opium since 1992.84 
Afghanistan’s percentage of world-wide opium production has increased from 20 percent 
in 1980 to 70 percent in 2000, and has remained at over 90 percent since 2006.85The 
significant rise in opium production coincides with over 30 years of war, devastated 
infrastructure, and dismal economic conditions, all of which have made Afghanistan one 
of the poorest countries in the world. High rates of poverty combined with degraded 
infrastructure, the relative ease of poppy cultivation (the poppy is a resilient plant that 
requires less water than wheat), and the lucrativeness of the drug trade have increased the 
appeal of poppy production. Furthermore, the opium poppy has significantly longer 
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growing and harvesting times, making it more labor intensive than other crops, thus 
necessitating the employment of more people.86 For many Afghans, growing poppy is 
one of the few means for providing a viable income for their survival.  
Afghan opium production predates the rise of warlords and the Taliban, but the 
drug trade reached new and ever increasing heights with their emergence. In 1980, 
Afghanistan produced 200 metric tons of opium, but by 1983 this number had grown to 
575 metric tons after several resistance leaders began encouraging local populations to 
grow poppies.87 There are a few reasons besides financial gain that prompted various 
groups to encourage poppy cultivation. First, the profits from poppy opium could be used 
for military purposes. Drug profits enabled groups to upgrade their arsenals, pay salaries 
to fighters, and decrease their dependency on external sponsors.88 Second, poppy 
cultivation increased legitimacy and popular support among the local populace. Set 
against the poor economic conditions of Afghanistan, groups were able to use opium 
revenues to provide goods and services to the local communities such as clinics and 
schools.89  
In late 1994 and early 1995, the Taliban seized Helmand and banned the 
cultivation of marijuana and opium, resulting in a one-third drop in opium production 
between 1994 and 1995.90 However, the Taliban’s efforts to end poppy production 
threatened their popular legitimacy and support among the local populace. This loss in 
legitimacy forced the Taliban to lift its ban on cultivation in 1996.91 Following this shift 
in policy, the Taliban was able to consolidate its control over the majority of Afghanistan 
even though it did not reverse any of its other unpopular policies.92 In 2013, Afghanistan 
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produced over 5,500 metric tons of opium with a farm gate value of over $950 million 
dollars.93 The exact amount the Taliban has received over the years from the drug trade is 
not certain, but the revenue has probably been significant because they have been 
involved in all aspects of the drug trade from taxing farmers and traffickers to growing it 
themselves. From the 1990s to the present, drug trade revenue has allowed the Taliban to 
fund their insurgency and appease the local populace. 
Afghanistan’s neighbors are directly impacted by the production and trafficking 
of narcotics. In 2010, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) estimated 
that drug traffickers in Central Asia made a net profit of $1.4 billion transiting opiates.94 
Over a quarter of all opiates trafficked from Afghanistan passes through Central Asia 
with 85 percent transiting Tajikistan and about 10 percent crossing through Uzbekistan.95 
Kyrgyzstan does not share a border with Afghanistan, but due to its borders with 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it is the preferred route as drugs pass from those countries on 
to other destinations. It is estimated that 70–75 tons of heroin reached Kazakhstan via 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010.96  
The volume of drugs continues to increase, but the volume of seizures has 
continued to decline overall in Central Asia. In 2010, heroin seizures dropped by 25 
percent and opium seizures dropped by 36 percent.97 This trend is worrisome for several 
reasons, but of particular concern are the possible connections between organized crime 
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rings and state power institutions. Of particularly concern is the fact that no major drug 
kingpin has been arrested in Central Asia since regional independence in 1991.98 
G. CONCLUSION 
This outline of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, followed by the 
Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and Afghanistan’s subsequent loss of financial, 
diplomatic and military support provides the following conclusions. First, Afghan 
security forces were sufficiently trained, manned, equipped, and did not collapse when 
the Soviet withdrew. These forces continued to be viable until the Soviet funding, 
advising and military aid ceased when the Soviet Union collapsed. This observation 
suggests that funding, equipping and advising Afghan troops was paramount for their 
survival in the wake of the war.  
Second, the security situation improved initially following the Soviet withdrawal 
because many resistance fighters ceased operations against the Afghan military when 
Soviet troops withdrew, most likely because the withdrawal of their foreign backers 
eased tensions between Afghan forces and the militias. Furthermore, Soviet funding 
helped pay for militia support of the government, which reduced fighting. However, the 
security condition began to rapidly disintegrate when Soviet economic and military 
assistance stopped in 1992, following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Many of the 
government security forces and hired militias quit supporting the Afghan government and 
either joined one of the mujahedeen factions or aligned themselves with warlords when 
the Afghan government could no longer pay their salaries. This observation, like the first 
point, emphasizes that financial aid to the Afghan government was essential for 
maintaining both its security forces and reducing threats posed by the militias. 
Third, the Afghan government continued to function after Soviet withdrawal in 
1989—albeit in deteriorating state—but quickly collapsed after Soviet military, 
humanitarian, and economic assistance stopped. Between 1989 and 1991, the Afghan 
government was unable to develop a sustainable economy and the loss of finances 
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amplified the flawed ethnic reconciliation and integration policies that never took root. 
Following the collapse of the Najibullah government, the power struggle that occurred 
among the country collapsed into lawlessness and in fighting among warlords. The 
Taliban came to power as a result of this power vacuum and the population initially 
welcomed their arrival as a legitimate authority that restored order. This observation 
suggests that the costs associated with the collapse of the central government are disorder 
and the potential for groups that can provide security—at any cost—to step in and assume 
authority. As with security in post-Soviet war Afghanistan, the loss of financial support 
to the government caused its collapse. 
Finally, the loss of Soviet financial support signaled the Afghan economic 
collapse. With poor infrastructure to support economic development and the lack of 
opportunity for the average Afghan, the economy quickly became one based primarily on 
producing narcotics. The majority of Afghanis that grew or moved drugs saw it as a 
viable means of providing for one’s family. However, various warlords and armed groups 
also saw the military applications of funding from narcotics, which helped in recruiting 
and better equipping their forces. The Taliban’s attempt at eradicating poppy production 
cost them popular support. This observation suggests that the Soviet’s and Afghan 
government’s inability to create a viable economy led to insecurity and the rise of the 
country’s narco trafficking, which created further instability in the region and arguably 
the world.  
Chapter III will build on these observations to investigate the effects that the 




III. THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM 
AFGHANISTAN AND COLLAPSE ON CENTRAL ASIA 
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1992 caused significant changes in Central Asia. Five new Central 
Asian states were created almost overnight while the people of these newly formed 
countries struggled with their independence. As governance expert David Lewis states, 
The five new states that emerged in 1991 from the wreckage of the USSR 
faced huge challenges…. New leaders of these states had to begin 
everything from scratch: borders, passports, national flags, a diplomatic 
service, foreign relations, national armies, and much else. Above all, they 
had to retain stability in states that suffered from considerable social and 
ethnic fractures underneath the Soviet façade of unity and homogeneity.99  
All of the Central Asian states would have to resolve their internal issues with 
new and inexperienced governments. For Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, these 
challenges included both domestic problems and regional concerns, especially in the 
Ferghana Valley, which all three countries share.  
This chapter examines two significant events that led to social and political 
instability in Central Asia. First, it looks briefly at the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1989 and its effects on Central Asia. Second, the chapter investigates the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 and the various challenges presented by the 
overnight creation of new states in Central Asia. Of the two regional challenges, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent Central Asian States created 
ethnic and tribal challenges that perpetuated instability. Tajikistan experienced a 
complete societal and political breakdown, which led to a civil war based on regionalism 
and ideology. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while not collapsing into civil war, withstood 
smaller, violent clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. The Ferghana Valley, in 
particular, became a tinder box of unrest due to its divisions between the three republics 
of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  
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This examination provides insights into what made these Central Asian states 
more or less susceptible to instability following the withdrawal of Soviet support. 
Identifying these vulnerabilities can assist in developing mitigating strategies prior to 
U.S. and NATO forces withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2014. 
The chapter begins by discussing the effects of the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and its impact on neighboring Central Asian states. It then describes the 
effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the region and, in particular, how the Soviet 
collapse affected economic, social, political, and religious dynamics in the region. The 
chapter then looks specifically at the Ferghana Valley and its unique challenges for social 
and political stability during this period.  
A. THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN 
The Soviet invasion of and withdrawal from Afghanistan affected Central Asia in 
several key ways. First, there was the issue of unsecured borders: Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan both share borders with Afghanistan. Tajikistan has the larger border at 1300 
kilometers, and Uzbekistan has a significantly smaller border of 137 kilometers, but a 
distance that still presented challenges for border security in the wake of the war.  
Second, ethnic groups also affected dynamics in the region. One of the immediate 
concerns in the wake of the war involved the return of Central Asian mujahedeen fighters 
to their home states. These fighters became significantly greater threats to stability 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Tajiks and Uzbeks comprised 32 
percent of Afghanistan’s 17 million inhabitants in 1979 with 4 million and 1.5 million 
respectively.100 All Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan, which did not have a 
co-ethnic affiliation in Afghanistan, participated in the war. Furthermore, the Soviets 
used reservists and draftees from the Turkestan Military District, adjacent to Afghanistan, 
to fight the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, involving these groups in the war. Consequently, 
Muslim draftees from these areas constituted almost 30 percent of the available 18-year 
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olds.101 Muslim veterans from the Soviet-Afghanistan war received a special level of 
respect, which they maintain to this day. Central Asian veterans, for example, are well 
represented in security services and presidential entourages of both Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.102  
Another effect of the Soviet-Afghan war and the subsequent Soviet withdrawal is 
that it played a role in promoting radical Islam in Central Asia. Jumaboi Khojayev, (also 
known by the nom de guerre Juma Namangan) was a former Soviet paratrooper in 
Afghanistan and established the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) at the end of the 
war, which will be discussed further below.103 Additionally, a few hundred Central Asian 
soldiers are estimated to have joined the mujahedeen, and a hand full returned to their 
homelands with the intention of establishing an Islamic state.104 Despite these efforts to 
spread radical Islam, most Central Asians found it hard to identify with their ethnic 
kinsmen in Afghanistan. For example, Jiayi Zhou’s records a post-war interview with an 
Uzbek veteran, who claims: “How could I feel kinship with them? Our lifestyle was like 
a fairy tale to them. They were all dumb and poor.”105 Fifty-plus years of Soviet 
influence, including mass education and literacy as well as the promotion of secularism 
gave many Central Asians the feeling that they were more advanced and better off than 
their Afghan brethren. This most likely helped to prevent the spread of radical Islam 
following the war.  
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B. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
CENTRAL ASIA 
The republics of Central Asia and the country of Afghanistan continued to receive 
economic, political, and military support from the Soviet Republic even after the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, once the Soviet Union ceased to exist, so too did 
the benefits and support of state sponsorship. Each state experienced unique challenges, 
which are outlined below, following the end of Soviet sponsorship.  
1. Tajikistan 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Tajikistan had been 
under Russian rule since its expansion into Central Asia in the nineteenth century. 
Tajikistan was granted status as an autonomous republic of Uzbekistan in 1924 before 
receiving full status as a Soviet republic in 1929. At the time of its full independence in 
1991, Tajikistan had no experience as an autonomous country, and the only model of 
governance it had firsthand experience with was Soviet-era political structures with no 
tradition of national political institutions.106 As a result, power struggles developed from 
the beginning of independence. Political parties consisted of neo-Soviet groups, modeled 
after Soviet style authority, and a collection of opposition forces with only vague ideas of 
how to establish a new government. Only three major opposition parties were recognized 
in 1991.107 However, the opposition parties were given merely token representation, and 
their ability to govern was never fully realized. Opposition reformists became frustrated 
with the absence of representation and emboldened with the fall of Afghan President 
Najibullah in the spring of 1992.108 Demonstrations in Tajikistan grew to nearly 50,000 
people, but the political and economic centers of Kulyab and Khojand refused to accept 
the reformists. The oppositionists eventually overthrew the president by forcing him to 
resign at gun point.109 
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The Tajik political disputes that occurred in 1992 are often erroneously simplified 
as communist (secular) versus fundamentalists (non-secular). This type of assessment 
does not take into account the complexity of the Tajik social and political environment at 
the time. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was a major political actor 
in the late Soviet period and played a crucial role in the civil war.110 The IRPT insisted 
they, “had no intention of establishing a theocratic fundamentalist state in Tajikistan, and 
that they would never strive to impose Islamic ideology and their objectives on the 
citizens of the country.”111 Rather, the IRPT wanted to restore the basics of Islam to 
society and begin the process of bringing Islamic knowledge and Islamic values back into 
public life.112  
The sincerity of the IPRT’s claims might be questionable, but it formed alliances 
with the underrepresented people of Gorno-Badakhshan, Gharm, and the minority 
Isma’ili Shias, none of whom were radical Islamic fundamentalists. Thus the opposition 
was composed of “Islamists,” secular reformists, and unorthodox Muslims against the 
neo-Soviets. The neo-Soviets conveniently categorized all oppositionists as Islamic 
fundamentalists and received international support in their efforts to curb potential 
Islamic radicalism.113 Many of the fears around Islamic activism in Tajikistan were based 
on developments in Afghanistan and the fear that rising Islamic militantism could spread 
to other Central Asian States. Regional expert Adeeb Khalid contends that the “struggle 
was over control of resources and of the mechanisms of power; the conflict was based on 
the regional networks of power that had emerged in the Soviet era.”114 
Following the forced change of power in Tajikistan, a civil war ensued. Similar to 
Afghanistan, the war was multifaceted and involved more than ideological differences; it 
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also included a regional power struggle that dated back nearly a hundred years.115 
Specifically, the economic and political center of Khojand formed an alliance with the 
Kulyab region after the creation of the Tajik republic in 1924. This alliance ensured the 
two regions maintained a special status while minimizing the influence of other regions 
in the country. The civil war reinvigorated this alliance. The war itself, however, was 
precipitated by more than just regional differences; ideology also played a role. Lewis 
contends,  
Much of the animosity was based on regional differences: southern 
Kulobis fought against eastern Gharmis, bringing to life tensions that had 
been simmering for years. It was not just regional animosity that sparked 
the violence, but also a clash between more secular ex-Communist leaders, 
new political groups that promoted an Islamist ideology, and a small 
intelligentsia seeking democratic change.116 
The underlying tensions and potential for instability in Tajikistan had been present long 
before they came to a flash point in 1992. However, the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union served as a catalyst to ignite old feuds.  
Economics also played a major role in Tajikistan’s descent into civil war. 
Tajikistan—like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—was not prepared for economic 
independence in 1992. Under the Soviet system, the Tajik economy had been assigned 
the specified task of supplying raw materials—primarily cotton, aluminum, and a few 
other materials.117 Additionally, Tajikistan had to depend on other republics to provide 
vital materials that were first routed through Moscow. Under the Soviet Union, Tajikistan 
was the poorest of the Soviet republics and was dependent on subsidies from the Soviet 
Union’s budget to meet the most basic needs of the population. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, living standards rapidly deteriorated when the subsidies stopped and 
trade and production declined.118 In 1992, the gross domestic product was approximately 
half of what it had been in 1990 and in 1991; the state’s total revenue was half as large as 
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the state’s expenses.119 Tajikistan’s poor state of economic affairs intensified regional 
tensions and animosities that led to the Tajik civil war.  
Another major contributor to Tajikistan’s instability was its lack of security 
forces. Tajikistan did not have an army of its own before the Soviet Union ended. 
However, the Russian 201
st
 Motorized Rifle Division and a unit of Russian Border 
Guards had been in Tajikistan since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989. The 201
st
 
Motorized Rifle Division consisted of about 8,000 soldiers, while the Border Guards 
numbered 2,000 soldiers.120 Russian forces were officially neutral in the civil war; 
however, they played a significant role in deterring reformist assaults that aimed to 
overthrow political leaders aligned with Moscow.  
For the first few months of independence, the Tajik government unsuccessfully 
attempted to organize a national guard. The effort failed because many reformists feared 
that a Soviet-minded president would use the military forces as an instrument of 
repression.121 Furthermore, attempts to develop an internal security force were 
exacerbated by the country’s poor economic conditions. As a result, the fledgling 
government relied on militias aligned with political groups that were more loyal to 
regional commanders than the central government.122  
In 1997, after five years of fighting and the loss of 50,000 to 100,000 lives and 
another one million displaced, a peace accord between the Tajik government and the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was signed.123 Author Elena Hay states that the 1997 
General Agreement resulted from the combination of several factors:  
First, exhaustion had taken its toll on both government and opposition 
forces in the forms of depleted supplies and financial resources, and 
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destruction to the country. Second, was the convergence of Iranian and 
Russian interests to promote peace while distancing the United States from 
the peace process and minimizing Taliban, Saudi, or Pakistani 
involvement in Tajikistan. Third, changes in northern Afghanistan by the 
military advances of the Taliban undermined the security of the UTO 
forces in the region. The Taliban were suspicious of the UTO’s close links 
with Iran and its affiliation with predominantly ethnic Uzbek and Tajik 
political and military leaders in northern Afghanistan. As a result, the 
UTO armed groups lost their important operational bases in Afghanistan. 
In addition, Afghan President Rabbani and Commander Massoud became 
dependent on cooperation with the Tajik government and Russia for arms, 
administration, fuel, food and routes of re-supply, and consequently 
ceased their alliance with the UTO.124  
The peace accord brought about the official end to the civil war, but elements of 
the UTO continued fighting. In 1999, the UTO disbanded its armed forces after being 
provided more representatives in governmental positions, along with the integration of 
UTO fighting forces into the armed forces of Tajikistan.125  
Politically, Tajikistan was rocked with instability from the very beginning of its 
independence. A strong, competent central government did not exist at the time of the 
Soviet Union collapse. Additionally, Tajikistan lacked well-developed structures and 
institutions to manage political conflict and competition, due in large part to the limited 
options for political expression allowed under the Soviet Union.126 Alliances and 
coalitions were often formed based on different ideologies and the ability to muster 
militias, but each faction also drew its support from particular regions. As Akiner and 
Barnes contend, armed conflict developed from the absence of political infrastructure 
capable of handling the contest for control of the state and the principles upon which the 
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new country would be founded: “secular or Islamic, democratic or authoritarian.”127 The 
quest for peace depended on international and transnational assistance, greater political 
inclusion for the disenfranchised, and compromise among all parties involved. 
The destructiveness of the Tajik civil war can still be seen in the country today 
from destroyed buildings and equipment to the psychological and emotional scars from 
those who witnessed the devastation firsthand. The magnitude of the conflict has 
potentially created a consensus among many that any peace is better than full war, but for 
how long? The violence of the civil war was caused by more than just the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. As Rashid Abdullo states, “it followed from the unresolved confrontation 
among various political forces in 1990–92 and was a manifestation and aggravation of 
divisions that already existed within Tajikistani society.”128 Tajikistan continues to 
struggle with regional inequalities, underdeveloped civil institutions, a disproportionately 
strong central government, and lack of a viable outlet for political dialogue. The country 
is also the poorest of the five central Asian states.  
2. Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan, unlike Tajikistan, had the fortune of a leader with experience. Islam 
Karimov became president of Uzbekistan with the December 1991 referendum granting 
state independence. Karimov, however, was not a new leader to the country; he had been 
in power as the First Secretary in Uzbekistan in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) following the Ferghana Valley riots of June 1989.129 Karimov’s experience as a 
head of state allowed him to cement factional alliances and play potential opposition 
groups against one another. Uzbekistan’s transition from the post-Soviet period, 
therefore, was remarkably more stable than that of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
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The new Uzbek constitution of 1992 prescribed a secular, multi-party democratic 
government. Islamic fundamentalism never gained significant traction following the fall 
of the Soviet Union, despite the large numbers of mosques and religious schools that 
were built shortly after independence. However, the Uzbek population’s increased 
attention to Islam was more centered on understanding history and culture than political 
aspirations. Nevertheless, Karimov successfully used the fears of Islamic 
fundamentalism, visible in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as justification for his extreme 
repression of individuals, groups or ideas that challenged the state.  
Karimov also managed to co-opt or remove religious leaders who were not in line 
with his agenda. For example, in 1993, he forced a conservative mufti, a top religious 
official in the country, out of office and compelled him to leave the country. Karimov 
appointed a new mufti who undermined the Ferghana Valley clergy while gathering 
supporters to counter radical and political movements in the area.130 
Despite having some political advantages that helped stabilize the country, 
Uzbekistan shared many of the economic hard ships of Tajikistan. The economy 
experienced erratic supplies of necessary resources for industry, increased 
unemployment, high inflation, shortages of consumer goods, and an overall decline in 
industrial output.131 However, Uzbekistan’s GDP only fell about 20 percent in the first 
years of independence, compared to the Central Asian average of 50 percent. Uzbekistan 
experienced less severe economic hardships because of its focus on cotton production, 
which provided the country with an exportable commodity and less dependence on 
foreign trade and imported energy supplies. 132 Uzbekistan also had an abundance of 
natural resources such as gold, copper, zinc, and uranium, in addition to an abundance of 
natural gas that it could use domestically and for export. 133 
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Uzbekistan’s relative economic stability did not eradicate all economically-based 
grievances, however. The Ferghana Valley had long been a large supplier of cotton, oil, 
and gold, but its residents felt they were receiving an insignificant return on its material 
production. Perceptions of economic inequalities merged with demands for greater 
cultural and religious freedom.134 In 1989, Uzbeks and Turks fought on the Uzbek side of 
the Ferghana Valley over perceptions of economic inequality with an official death toll of 
103 and over 1,000 wounded.135 Uzbeks believed the Turks enjoyed an economic 
advantage while many Uzbeks suffered from a high rate of unemployment. Soviet troops 
were used to stop the violence while the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, 
Rafik Nishanov, was held accountable for the breakdown and replaced by Karimov. 
Local elites and Moscow pinned their hopes on Karimov to restore and maintain order.136 
He has continued to use harsh measures and strong rule to justify maintaining stability. 
Another manifestation of the desire for change occurred early in Karimov’s 
regime. In November 1991, Karimov visited the city of Namangan in the Ferghana 
Valley to meet with various officials, but refused to meet with many of the informal 
representatives including religious leaders before returning to Tashkent.137 In response to 
the perceived snub, a group called Adolat (Justice) formed a rally that was serious 
enough to force Karimov’s return the following day. Karimov’s return to Namangan was 
not well received by the local population. He was jostled by the crowd, and the 
demonstration’s organizers rudely “presented their demands which ranged from 
immediate and concrete to the far-reaching and abstract,” including the transformation of 
the Communist party center in the area into an Islamic center and the establishment of an 
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Islamic state in Uzbekistan.138 Karimov calmed the crisis by agreeing to convert the 
Communist party center into an Islamic center, and to consider the other two demands. 
However, as soon as he was able to reassert his authority he had the Islamic center closed 
and had security forces root out all militias in the Ferghana Valley.139  
Another advantage Uzbekistan held over Tajikistan was that it had a large military 
force at the time of independence. Uzbekistan inherited the command structure and 
armament that had been headquartered in Tashkent.140 The Ministry of Defense Affairs 
assumed jurisdiction over the former Soviet Turkestan Military District in Tashkent with 
approximately 60,000 Soviet military troops to include a fighter-bomber regiment, an 
engineer brigade, and an airborne brigade.141 The Uzbek security forces were the most 
powerful in Central Asia and were used to combatting narcotics trafficking, weapons 
smuggling, and civil unrest within Uzbek borders as well as providing ground forces 
support to President Imomali Rahmon’s neo-Soviets in Tajikistan. 142  
Following the initial years of independence much has remained the same. Most 
large enterprises are state owned with the majority of wealth being held by a few elites, 
while almost a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line. Cotton is still the 
major agricultural export and human rights are trumped by political survival. The most 
enduring aspect of President Karimov’s regime has been the continued and increased use 
of coercive and repressive tactics to minimize any and all forms of political opposition or 
political grievances. Memorial, a Moscow-based human rights organization, states 
“Uzbekistan has jailed 10,000 political prisoners, a number that exceeds political 
imprisonment in all of the other former Soviet states combined.”143  
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Furthermore, Karimov openly and violently condemns expressions of Islamic 
worship not condoned or controlled by the state. In April 1998, Karimov addressed the 
Uzbek parliament concerning the need to register mosques and monitor their practices. 
Karimov stated, “Such people [Islamic extremists] must be shot in the head. If necessary, 
I’ll shoot them myself, if you lack the resolve.”144  
The most shocking display of this oppressive mentality occurred in June 2004, in 
the town of Andijan in the Ferghana Valley. The Uzbek government arrested 23 pious 
businessmen, claiming the men were members of an illegal Islamic group called 
Akramiya. On May 11 2005, their trial ended with all 23 men found guilty; several 
protestors were arrested. By the following day, the number of demonstrators protesting 
the verdict numbered between two and three thousand. On the night of May 12, after 
seizing weapons from a police station and an army barracks, a group of men stormed the 
prison and freed the 23 men.145  
Neither the newly freed prisoners nor their liberators fled. Instead, they stayed in 
Andijan and made a request for President Karimov to visit so they could air their 
grievances. Instead, Karimov sent more security forces that opened fire on the protesters 
on the evening of May 13. The Uzbek government claims it killed 187 terrorists or 
insurgents, while human rights organizations put the number closer to 800 with the 
majority being innocent civilians.146 Uzbek authorities also claimed the fighters had been 
trained by international terrorists and were the first to use force while many in the 
international community claim the government troops initiated the use of force.147 After 
the brutal suppression at Andijan, the Uzbek government stood by its account of events 
and refused to allow international observers to investigate Andijan. Shortly after this 
event, the U.S. government withdrew economic assistance to Uzbekistan and closed its 
military base there.  
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Kyrgyzstan was unique among the Central Asian States in regard to the selection 
of its first president upon independence. Askar Akayev, a physicist, was the country’s 
first president not to have held a high position in the Communist Party.148 Akayev came 
to power on the promise of economic and political reforms following the 1990 Osh riots 
in the Ferghana Valley that exploded after a conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
and required Soviet President Gorbachev to call in the Red Army to stabilize the 
region.149 Akayev also capitalized on a failed communist coup in 1991that further 
discredited the communists as a legitimate force in Kyrgyzstan. 150 
Kyrgyzstan remained a secular state after independence and decreed that no 
religion would be recognized as the state religion and that religious organizations could 
not pursue political goals.151 There were no recorded Islamic parties seeking political 
representation in the elections prior to or following independence. Kyrgyz Muslims are 
only 70 percent of the population, with the remainder being a mix of tribal religions and 
Russian Orthodox.152 Despite having a smaller percentage of Muslims than its neighbors, 
Kyrgyzstan still had a small minority that was agitating for an Islamic government. This 
minority never gained any significant support or traction and a radical Islamic movement 
did not take root. 
As with the other Central Asian states, economic circumstances also affected 
Kyrgyzstan’s transition to independence. Lewis argues that, “at independence in 1991 the 
country was not prepared for state-building. It had little industrial infrastructure, with 
most of the population engaged in agriculture, and some 70 percent of the local budget 
came from Moscow and then the money disappeared with the dissolution of the 
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USSR.”153 Also like other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan’s economy suffered because 
it had been an exporter of raw material to Moscow and imported finished goods, which 
cost more than the raw material exports. This trade deficit resulted in the Kyrgyz 
economy plummeting in 1991 and 1992. Retail sales declined by 64 percent in 1991; 
wholesale prices rose 18 times higher in 1992; and retail prices soared 40 percent in 
1992. These were the worst economic statistics in Central Asia.154 Even with the 
implementation of new economic reforms, including the privatization of businesses and 
support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kyrgyzstan could not stabilize its 
economy. 
Kyrgyzstan leads Central Asia in privatization of all commercial enterprises, but 
is still heavily reliant on foreign assistance. Eurasianet reported that foreign aid of $1.2 
billion accounted for over 25 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 gross domestic product 
(GDP).155 Gold production has been the largest industrial source of GDP, while 
agriculture accounts for one-quarter of the GDP and employs one-half of the work 
force.156 However, as of 2012, the poverty rate grew to include one-third of the 
population and remittances from migrant workers increased by 15 percent, $1.8 billion 
per annum.157 While Kyrgyzstan has made advancements in its economic policies since 
independence, it appears that those economic gains are not being distributed equally. 
In addition to economic challenges, Kyrgyzstan also suffers from a lack of 
political freedom. Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, comments on 
how the semi-parliament created in 2010 has replaced the one-family rule of former 
President Bakiyev with a “system of coalition-based corruption, where the country’s 
major economic, political, and territorial assets are divided among political parties with a 
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detrimental impact on their ability to govern the country.”158 Thus, like its neighbors, 
Kyrgyzstan also suffered from governmental corruption that contributed and even 
encouraged much of the criminal activity.  
Unlike its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan had a different trajectory regarding its security 
and military. Specifically, upon independence, Kyrgyzstan showed the least interest of 
the Central Asian states in forming its own military.159 Initial efforts to create a Kyrgyz 
national military never materialized for several reasons, but poor economic conditions 
and recognized dependency on Russian provided security were the greatest 
contributors.160 In June 1992, Kyrgyzstan took control of the remaining units of the 
former Soviet army of around 15,000 former Soviet soldiers of mixed ethnic and national 
identities, presenting considerable challenges for creating a Kyrgyz military.161 
Furthermore, the significant majority of the officer corps was largely Russians, who 
refused to serve in the Kyrgyz military and either repatriated to Russia or deserted.162 
Kyrgyzstan’s inability to develop a strong military did not negatively affect the country’s 
security. However, the country’s internal security suffered from a lack of forces equipped 
to deal with a myriad of challenges. Internal security forces, such as the police and border 
guards, found accomplishing their tasks difficult due to low pay and inadequate 
resources. From 1991 to 1992, police reported that drug related crimes rose 222 percent 
with 70 percent of the 44,000 crimes reported being related to drugs.163 
Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country—barring Tajikistan’s 1991-1992 
tumultuous political periods—to have forced an unpopular president out of office and 
they have done it twice. In 2005, President Akayev was forced to resign and his 
successor, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was pushed out of office on April 6, 2010. 
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While Kyrgyzstan has shown that its people can mobilize to protest and attempt to 
address grievances, it still has considerable progress to make concerning human rights 
and the treatment of ethnic minorities.  
Kyrgyzstan may not have attained the level of social, political, and economic 
reform that President Akayev had proposed when he took office, but it has progressed 
more than Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. The country is still one of the poorest in Central 
Asia, and its unequal distribution of wealth to a select few could continue to fuel 
domestic instability. Additionally, the discriminatory treatment of ethnic Uzbeks appears 
to be more than a perception.  
The Ferghana Valley is an area that consists of portions of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan. It is the most densely populated area of Central Asia constituting 25 
percent of the region’s total population (14 million of the 63 million) on five percent of 
the region’s total land area and 1,600 people per square mile compared to 40.8 people per 
square mile for the rest of the region.164 The borders that define the area were an 
intentional design by Stalin’s mapmakers in the 1920s, who aimed to prevent any one 
country from controlling all the resources in the region and challenging the Soviet 
Union.165 Furthermore, the mapmakers’ boundaries did not follow natural geographic 
formations and did not consider ethnic, clan, or new national identities. This resulted in 
Tajikistan having a large Uzbek and a smaller Kyrgyz minority with Kyrgyzstan having 
Uzbek and Tajik minorities while Uzbekistan has a large Tajik and smaller Kyrgyz 
minority.166 Consequently, national boundaries were not important considerations for 
determining access to natural resources such as water and infrastructure development 
including roads and railways.167 The impact of these divisions during the Soviet era was 
minimal since the entire region was subjugated to Moscow and the Soviet military. 
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However, this all changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of new national 
identities, and competition over natural resources. Lewis states that during the Soviet 
times, the borders held no meaning and people could cross back and forth without 
difficulty. However, “after independence all the paraphernalia of state sovereignty—
passports, visas and customs’ brought latent tensions forward.”168 
Political, religious and ethnic battles for primacy in the Ferghana Valley are not 
new. In 1898, a Sufi sheikh incited two thousand followers to attack the Russian barracks 
in Andijan, killing 22 soldiers as they slept.169 Violent disputes also occurred in the 
Ferghana Valley during the Soviet era. In 1989, clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian 
Turks occurred as well as clashes between Tajiks and Kyrgyz over water and land access 
that resulted in 19 wounded and one death.170 Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
most violent clash occurred in June 1990 between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. A dispute over 
farmland occurred in the Kyrgyz city of Osh when a significant Uzbek minority felt it 
was underrepresented in local decision making.171 Soviet troops brought peace to the 
area, but not before a few hundred people were killed.  
Since the Soviet Union collapsed, multiple clashes of varying intensity have 
occurred in the Ferghana Valley—the most violent being the 2005 crackdown in Andijan 
and the 2010 Osh conflict. Ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks exploded in the 
cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, both in the Ferghana Valley, from June 10-13, 2010. 
According to regional expert Nichol, the causes for the fighting included ethnic 
Kyrgyz’s’ perceptions that Uzbeks controlled commerce, ethnic Uzbeks’ perceptions that 
they were excluded from the political process, and ousted Bakiyev supporters claiming 
Uzbeks supported the opposition.172 The fighting resulted in at least 470 deaths and 
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nearly 2,000 injuries with Uzbeks comprising three-quarters of those killed.173 However, 
many claim the death toll to be much higher since only the dead that were taken to the 
hospitals were counted. Additionally, nearly 400,000 refugees and internally displaced 
persons resulted from the fighting with over 3,000 homes and businesses destroyed.  
A January 2011 Kyrgyz inquiry reported the violence was due to Uzbek 
extremists, Bakiyev supporters, and ineptness of interim government officials in handling 
of the situation. However, a separate report in May 2011 by the Special Representative 
for Central Asia of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Kimmo Kiljunen, submitted 
different findings. Kiljunen’s findings concluded that the Kyrgyz provisional government 
failed to provide adequate security and leadership, the Kyrgyz general in charge of Osh 
security did not use his forces to stop the conflict, thus raising concerns that the military 
may have been complicit in the violence, and the Commandant of Jalal-Abad did not try 
to quell violence or adequately investigate and prosecute the offenders.174 Kiljunen 
recommended that the government promote better ethnic and gender equality while 
training security forces to uphold human rights, and that the government establish a 
reconciliation committee. The Kyrgyz government rejected all findings, declared the 
report biased, a threat to national security, and declared Kiljunen persona non grata.175 A 
2012 report by the International Crisis Group states, “ethnic Uzbeks made up 77 per cent 
of those detained and charged for crimes related to the June 2010 violence.”176 
In addition to disputes over political representation and resources, the Ferghana 
Valley is also suspected of being a potential hotbed of Islamic militancy. The predecessor 
of the IMU, Adolat, had formed in 1991 in the Namangan district of the Ferghana Valley 
before being expelled from Uzbekistan in early 1992. The IMU received international 
attention between 1999 and 2000 with numerous cross border incursions into Uzbekistan 
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that included the kidnapping of American and Japanese nationals. The IMU’s stated goal 
is to overthrow central Asian regimes through jihad and create a pan-Islamic caliphate. 
Despite this, the IMU denied any involvement in the February 1999 bombings in 
Tashkent and additional bombings in Bishkek.177 Several argue that the threat of the IMU 
is an effective propaganda device used by both the Rahmon regime in Tajikistan and the 
Karimov regime in Uzbekistan to further justify their brutally repressive measures. For 
example, Craig Murray, British Ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2002-2004, argues that 
the Tashkent attacks in 2004 were orchestrated by the Uzbek security apparatus and not 
an extremist organization.178 Additionally, the IMU was essentially destroyed along with 
one of their leaders and founders, Jumaboi Khojayev, by U.S. attacks in Afghanistan in 
2001.179 The extent of IMU involvement in regional unrest and their overall capability is 
debated by many.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The investigation of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and its subsequent 
collapse in 1991 offers the following observations. First, the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan did not considerably degrade security in Central Asia because it was 
still part of the Soviet Union. As such, Central Asia received military, political, and 
economic guidance and assistance as members of the Soviet Union. However, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of sponsorship in 1992 significantly impacted 
Central Asia and affected security in each country. Uzbekistan was able to capitalize on 
the large military structure it inherited from the Soviet Union and aggressively impose 
order, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan did not have their own national security forces. 
Kyrgyzstan survived the transitional period relatively unscathed, but the security vacuum 
in Tajikistan resulted in a devastating civil war and gave rise to militias, warlords, and 
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heightened regional, ethnic and religious tensions throughout the country. This 
observation suggests that, to differing degrees, the absence of sufficient security forces 
presented a considerable challenge to Central Asian countries following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  
Second, upon independence, the Central Asian governments were inexperienced 
and did not know how to function as sovereign states. As the new Central Asian 
governments struggled with the process of state building, the fall of the Najibullah regime 
in Afghanistan and the civil war in Tajikistan became powerful reminders of the costs of 
weakened authority and security. These lessons prompted the leaders of virtually all 
Central Asian states to focus on regime survival, as opposed to democratic processes or 
liberties for their populations. Under these conditions, the emergence of any group that 
could be construed as a challenge to these governments was met with a heavy hand. 
Violent extremist organizations did exist in Central Asia, but their size and capabilities 
were greatly exaggerated. This observation suggests that weakened security combined 
with inexperienced and insecure regimes created oppression within the countries studied. 
Third, the Central Asian economies were part of a consolidated economic unit and 
were centrally planned by the Soviet Union. Following independence, none of the 
countries were familiar with how to transition to an independent market-based economy. 
Furthermore, each country suffered because they were no longer being subsidized by or 
forming a part of the larger Soviet economy. During the Soviet era, Uzbekistan produced 
the overwhelming majority of cotton for the entire Soviet Union and provided natural gas 
to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were both smaller 
agrarian societies, the Soviet division of labor had them specialize in hydro-power 
generation and consequently controlling the water flow for downstream Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan would receive water needed for irrigation and provide Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan with natural gas and other resources in a mutually beneficial exchange of 
goods and services. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the importance of regional 
interdependence and a lack of cooperation between neighboring states began to affect 
them all. As the Central Asian countries displayed a lack of regional cooperation, their 
economies suffered and drug related crimes rose.  
48 
Fourth, the social change that occurred as a result of the shift from a Soviet 
identity to new national identities revealed the attachment to regional, tribal, and clan 
based identities. These new identities combined with economic inequalities, lack of 
political representation, and regional differences to create considerable tensions 
throughout the region. In Tajikistan, these disparities resulted in a brutal civil war. 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had conflicts, but never experienced a civil war. However, 
the Ferghana Valley—shared by all three countries studied—exhibited several bouts of 
conflict. Although the Ferghana Valley was historically a religiously conservative area, 
the conflicts that arose in this area often had more to do with competition for resources 
and perceived inequalities than religious or ethnic differences.  
The next chapter will investigate the region today and consider the condition of 
these countries as the NATO and U.S. forces plan to withdraw from the region. 
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IV. AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA TODAY 
As Chapters II and II have outlined, Afghanistan and Central Asia have been 
strategically linked to one another geographically, economically, and socially, 
particularly during the transformative events of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1989 and its eventual collapse at the end of 1991. This chapter outlines 
the current political, economic, social and security landscape of Afghanistan and its 
neighboring Central Asian states. From this discussion, Chapter V will investigate 
potential trajectories that Afghanistan and Central Asian states may take after 2014, and 
possible mitigation strategies that the U.S. government and military could take.  
A. AFGHANISTAN IN 2014 
Afghanistan’s political, economic, social, and security environment today, while 
showing considerable progress over the last decade, still faces significant challenges for 
stability following U.S. and NATO forces’ withdrawal in 2014. In order to discuss 
possible trajectories after U.S. and NATO withdrawal, it is first necessary to outline 
current conditions. 
First, political stability is crucial for a successful transition as U.S. and NATO 
forces prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s ability to 
demonstrate its capacity, transparency, and legitimacy to its people is essential for this to 
occur. However, several aspects of the Afghan government suggest that these goals will 
be challenging to meet. First, federal and local levels of the Afghan government suffer 
from corruption related challenges resulting from favoritism, incompetency, weak public 
administration, organized crime, illicit drugs, and dependency on foreign aid.180 
Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perception Index ranked Afghanistan 175th 
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out of 177 countries assessed.181 These troubling statistics suggest that Afghanistan is 
nowhere near meeting the challenges of transparency and legitimacy. 
Second, the Afghan government continues to struggle to create a power-sharing 
arrangement among its various ethnic factions. Article 35 of the Afghan constitution bans 
political parties based on ethnicity or religious sect, but many of the 56 parties that are 
registered today are relatively ethnically homogenous.182 Middle East expert Kenneth 
Katzman states that every post-Taliban Afghan election has been characterized by 
“patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and 
comradeship in past battles [that] often supersede relationships based on ideology or 
views.”183  
The 2014 presidential election shows the potential for tailoring political platforms 
to appeal to as many segments of the population as possible. Presidential candidate Dr. 
Abdullah Abdullah of the Northern Alliance is recognized politically as a Tajik because 
he was a top aide to Ahmad Shah Massoud, but due to his mixed heritage (Tajik mother, 
Pashtun father) he appeals to Tajiks and Pashtuns.184 Dr. Abdullah chose Mohammad 
Khan (Pashtun) as a vice presidential running mate and Mohammad Mohaqiq (Hazara) as 
another vice presidential running mate. The other leading presidential candidate, Ashraf 
Ghani, (Pashtun) chose Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek) as a vice presidential candidate 
and Sarwar Danish (Hazara) as another vice presidential running mate.  
On September 29, 2014 Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as President of Afghanistan 
and Dr. Abdullah assumed the newly formed position of Chief Executive of the country. 
The new unity government concluded a highly contested election marked by allegations 
of fraud from both President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah. While the power 
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sharing agreement averted fears of civil war, there are concerns that the new coalition 
will become mired in power struggles and rivalries between competing interests.185 The 
new unity government not only faces potential internal fractures between President Ghani 
and Chief Executive Abdullah, but credibility issues brought about by the nature of the 
power sharing agreement and disappointment of many in the electoral process.186 
While none of the parties are officially based on ethnicity or sectarianism, it does 
not mean that historic ethnic factors or informal power structures have disappeared. It is 
important to note that many of these powerful political figures are influential members in 
informal power structures and justice systems. Figures such as Rashid Dostum, the 
powerful Uzbek warlord who supported Najibullah before defecting and aligning with the 
mujahedeen, can mobilize voters as well as mobilize armed militias.187 The inclusion of 
these powerful individuals into positions of official power poses a dilemma. On one side, 
the inclusion of diverse ethnic, regional, and tribal leaders goes a long way toward 
advancing reconciliation measures and helps to potentially fill gaps in government 
provided sectors. On the other, mobilization of armed groups could shift their emphasis 
from fighting the Taliban to fighting one another, similar to the 1992–1996 civil war.  
Third, the Taliban presents its own unique challenge for Afghan stability. Some 
claim that the Taliban have limited legitimacy and minimal support for their resistance to 
the government.188 A November 2013 DOD report asserts that Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) were able to maintain territorial gains won by International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF) and “insurgent territorial influence and kinetic capabilities have 
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remained static.”189 Potentially, the grimmest report comes from the February 2014 
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) that states,  
The security environment in Afghanistan will become more challenging 
after the drawdown of most international forces in 2014, and that the 
Taliban insurgency will become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s stability 
in the 2015–2018 timeframe than it is now.190  
A decisive military victory over the Taliban may be unattainable, but 
reconciliation between the Taliban and Afghan government may prove to be equally 
difficult, as it will have ramifications for all sectors of Afghan society. Many minorities, 
women, intellectuals, and others fear that freedoms grated over the last decade would be 
reversed if the Taliban were allowed obtain political appointments or control over 
territory.191 Finally, the Taliban’s incentive to negotiate with the Afghan government 
may be reduced due to revenue from poppy harvests and the security environment, which 
will be discussed below.192  
Fourth, Afghanistan’s continued economic development is considered crucial for 
stability after 2014. Currently, Afghanistan’s economy is not yet stable or sustainable and 
is dependent on foreign aid. Donor aid accounts for more than 95 percent of 
Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP), and the Afghan government has requested 
$10 billion per year in donated funds until 2025.193 In 2012, international donors met in 
Tokyo and constructed the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) that 
pledged economic support of $16 billion for development through 2015 with 
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commitments of similar levels until 2017.194 This assistance relies on the Afghan 
government to comply with a framework that promotes aid effectiveness, reform, good 
governance, and inclusive sustained growth.195 Security and political uncertainty in 2014 
led to decreased private investment and slowed economic reforms, but donors have 
continued to provide economic assistance for the time being.196 A World Bank report 
from December 2011 warned that an abrupt cutoff of aid could lead to fiscal implosion, 
loss of control over the security sector, collapse of political authority, and possible civil 
war.197 
Furthermore, nearly eight percent of the Afghan population is considered 
unemployed while nearly 50 percent is underemployed.198 Agriculture accounts for over 
78 percent of the labor force and provides 20 percent of the national GDP and, as such, is 
important to economic development and poverty reduction. Nearly nine million 
Afghans—36 percent—are not able to meet basic nutrition needs and fall below the 
poverty line.199  
On a potentially positive note, Afghanistan has significant amounts of mineral 
reserves and petroleum resources. In 2007, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released 
findings that Afghanistan possessed untapped minerals worth over $1 trillion with finding 
of 60 million metric tons of copper, 2,200 million metric tons of iron ore, 1.4 million 
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metric tons of rare earth elements such as uranium.200 In addition, Afghanistan has 
proven reserves of 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.201 
Afghanistan has the potential for a sustainable economy and energy self-sufficiency, but 
political and security uncertainties impede significant investment and development of 
these resources. 
Opium poppy production will likely remain a central element in the Afghan 
economy in the immediate future. In 2013, both the United States and UN estimated that 
the number of hectares used to cultivate poppy increased from 2012 with a farm gate 
value of $950 million, four percent of Afghanistan’s GDP.202 This amount is significant 
given that foreign aid accounts for over 95 percent of the country’s economy. As such, 
opium production remains Afghanistan’s largest industry. The lucrativeness of the drug 
trade has far ranging ramifications for U.S. policy. Afghanistan narcotic trafficking has 
reciprocal ties with corrupt government officials at the central, provincial, and district 
levels; correspondingly, narcotic trafficking has deteriorated security and decreased 
access to development opportunities.203  
Fifth, Afghanistan has experienced advances in civil society and human rights 
since the Taliban regime was defeated in 2001, but these advancements remain uncertain 
and dependent on political stability in the country. Afghanistan has increasingly become 
more modernized and urbanized since 2001, but, “political affiliations by family, clan, 
tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and comradeship in past battles often supersede 
relationships based on ideology or views.”204 Despite traditional patterns of affiliation, 
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grievances between ethnic groups have generally been confined to the legitimate political 
process with only sporadic manifestations of clashes or political disputes.205 
Women and youth remain two of the most underrepresented groups in 
Afghanistan. There have been significant gains in women’s rights in spite of the 
traditional views and Islamic conservatism of many Afghans. Mandates dictate that half 
of the president’s appointment (17) to the upper house and at least 28 percent (68) of the 
appointments in the lower house are to be women. 206 Women are also serving in 
professions that were traditionally male-dominated such as the military, police force, and 
as judges, and as journalists. Despite these gains, gender discrimination remains 
prevalent. Of the eight million children that have enrolled in school since the Taliban 
regime, roughly 3.2 million were girls.207 The U.N. Girl’s Education Initiative reports 
that the literacy rate for women under 24 years of age is 18 percent compared to 50 
percent for boys, and only 13 percent of girls complete primary school compared to 50 
percent for boys.208 Afghanistan has a youth majority with 66 percent of the population 
under 24 years of age and 42 percent under the age of 14.209  
Despite the numbers of young people in Afghanistan, their impact in the political 
process has been limited. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) finds that the 
primary factor limiting youth mobilization is an “older generation of leaders’ stifling hold 
on power, whether locally, as commanders control resource flows to a specific district, or 
nationally, as ethnic party leaders keep young would-be challengers from rising up the  
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ranks or developing new movements of their own.”210 Both of these groups have reason 
to fear that gains that have been made since 2001 will be reversed if a more conservative 
political regime is installed. 
Finally, Afghan security has improved, but remains on shaky ground. Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) took the lead role for security in Afghanistan on June 
18, 2013.211 During 2013, the ANSF led more than 90 percent of all operations and lost 
only about three percent of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 engagements with Taliban and 
other insurgents, while not losing any significant amount of territory.212 These 
accomplishments have been made possible with an authorized ANSF size of 352,000 and 
significant economic assistance. The CNA reports that the ANSF will need 373,400 
personnel with personnel restructuring to build up logistics and support forces at a cost of 
$5-$6 billion per year from 2015-2018.213 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports the DOD budget request for Afghan Security Forces 
Fund (ASFF) in FY 2015 is $4.11 billion with 84 percent going towards salaries, fuel, 
and maintenance.214 The budget request for the ASFF is $3.6 billion less than the FY 14 
request, but is not sufficient to sustain the CNA recommendation of 373,400 without 
significant international donor assistance.215 On January 29, 2014, Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper testified that “the ANSF…will probably maintain control of 
most major cities as long as external financial support continues.”216 
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Ethnically, a DOD report notes that the overall ANSF force continues to come 
into line with the ethnic composition of Afghanistan, with Tajiks and Uzbeks collectively 
comprising 39.3 percent of the force with the majority of Pashtuns coming from the 
east.217 While the ethnic mixture seems to be technically balanced, it does not account for 
a potential flashpoint. In 2012, conflict expert Vanda Felbab-Brown testified before the 
House Armed Services Committee on the development of the ANSF and corruption in 
Afghanistan. Felbab-Brown comments that many soldiers are often not promoted because 
of ethnic fissures, and patronage networks that reward individuals based on ethnicity or 
factional alignment could potentially of fracture the ANSF.218 
B. TAJIKISTAN  
In November 2013, Emomali Rahmon was re-elected to another seven-year term 
as president, a position he had already held for 21 years out of the country’s 22 years of 
independence. In May 2013, businessman and former Industry Minister, Zaid Saidov, 
was arrested after he and other academics announced that they would form a new 
opposition party.219 Rahmon’s increased authoritative rule, practice of nepotism and 
cronyism, and marginalization of any potential political opponents have made succession 
and stability complicated issues. Rahmon has appointed multiple family members to top 
post in the Foreign Ministry, including a daughter as the first deputy foreign minister and 
his 26-year-old son as the chief of the customs service.220 Even though Rahmon replaced 
60 percent of the members of his government since 2013, it is believed that this was a 
common authoritative tactic preventing the appearance of a strong, potentially popular 
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political rival.221 While reshuffling political positions, Rahmon had to be mindful of 
maintaining the balance of traditional elites, allies, and his own dominant clan (Kulobi), 
or risk destabilizing ramifications such as a coup d’état.222 Thus, Tajikistan’s political 
future may be secure for the time being, but its longevity is uncertain.  
The Tajik government’s control and influence continues to be minimal in the 
eastern Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and the northern area of the 
Sughd Province portion of the Ferghana Valley. The GBAO is estimated to have three 
percent (210,200) of the population and 45 percent of the territory, while the Sughd 
Province is estimated to have 30 percent (2,349,000) of the population and 18 percent of 
the territory.223 Jane’s Eurasia analyst, Matthew Clements, states the Tajik government 
has reduced tensions and influence in the Ferghana Valley by being uninvolved in its 
affairs because, “there is very little government control outside of Dushanbe. And due to 
the geographical nature as well, the Ferghana Valley region of Tajikistan, where many of 
the Uzbeks do reside, is quite literally cut off from the rest of the country by the mountain 
ranges.”224 Thus, administrative control remains a challenge for Tajikistan.  
Economically, Tajikistan remains the poorest country in Central Asia, despite 
economic gains since the civil war. The CIA World Factbook claims: “Its economy 
continues to face major challenges, including dependence on remittances from 
Tajikistanis working in Russia, pervasive corruption, and the major role narcotrafficking 
plays in the country’s informal economy.”225 Tajikistan’s economy reportedly grew by 
7.4 percent in 2013, but record high remittances estimated at $4.1 billion equaled almost 
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49 percent of the GDP.226 Russia’s Federal Migration Service reported that 1.2 million 
Tajik citizens were residing in Russia as of October 18, 2013.227 The official 
unemployment rate in Tajikistan is 2.5 percent, but the World Bank estimates that 
unemployment is around 40 percent with slightly over 40 percent living below the 
poverty line.228 The World Bank’s poverty and inequality database revealed that the top 
20 percent of the population accounted for 39.4 percent of the wealth compared to the 
lowest 20 percent accounting for 8.3 percent.229  
With such a wide discrepancy in the distribution of wealth, it is not surprising that 
Tajikistan is instrumental in drug trafficking from Afghanistan. In 2010, 85 percent of the 
opiates (75–80 tons of heroin and 18–20 tons of opium) valued at a net profit of $1.4 
billion that passed through Central Asia were shipped through Tajikistan.230 The 
revenues from narcotic trafficking could explain the country’s ongoing construction 
boom and the lavish vehicles and houses that many public servants own.231 
Construction of the Roghun hydroelectric dam is a centerpiece of Tajikistan’s 
economic development strategy, but it has increased tensions with its neighbor, 
Uzbekistan.232 Tajik authorities have made the Roghun dam a symbol of their national 
revival ideology and claim the estimated 13.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity would 
exceed domestic consumption and export significant quantities to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.233 The construction of the Roghun dam is a vital component in the Central 
Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) electricity transmission project. The CASA-1000 project 
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is one component of the U.S. government’s vision of a “New Silk Road” to promote 
better inter-regional cooperation and economic development among Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan by providing an efficient electrical system.234 
Uzbekistan has opposed construction of the dam on the basis that it would endanger 
Uzbekistan’s agriculture production and damage the environment.235 Accordingly, 
Uzbekistan has delayed thousands of railcars and trucks, increased tariffs on railcars and 
trucks crossing into Tajikistan, restricted gas supplies to Tajikistan, and restricted 
Turkmen electricity supplies to Tajikistan.236 The Roghun dam project involves the Amu 
Darya River and does not directly impact the Ferghana Valley’s access to water, but 
Uzbekistan’s increased border restrictions are likely to increase tensions in the area.  
Ethnically, Tajiks comprise 80 percent of the population, while Uzbeks account 
for 15 percent. Sunni Muslims make up 85 percent of the population with Shia Muslims 
accounting for five percent of the population.237 Despite the accords that ended the civil 
war in 1997, Tajikistan continues to have challenges associated with ethnic and clan 
divides, as well as religious freedoms. Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian 
Affairs, states in a congressional report, 
President Rahmon increasingly has used rhetoric associated with Hanafi 
Sunni Islam and Tajik nationalism to define his rule. This rhetoric has 
alienated ethnic and religious minorities, including ethnic Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz and about 200,000 ethnic Pamiris in Mountainous Badakhshan 
who practice Ismaili Shiism. 238 
The Tajik government plays an aggressive role in shaping how Islam is 
worshipped due to the importance of religion in social and political spheres. While 
secular, the government has implemented laws that regulate the conduct of celebrations 
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and rituals and strictly monitor Islamic education and the work of the Muslim clergy.239 
In 2014, the state demonstrated its control over the spiritual and moral realm when it 
decreed that imam khatibs (leaders of prayer) would become public servants, and when 
the lower house of parliament declared the Hanafi movement of Sunni Islam as the 
official state religion.240 Religion and ethnicity are not the only sources of division in 
Tajikistan. The practice of favoring or minimizing groups based on their regional 
affiliation is, perhaps, just as, or more important, to the growing frustration of many. 
Regional identification based on the four administrative divisions of Sughd, 
Khatlon, GBAO, and the Region of Republic Subordination (RRS) remains an important 
component of Tajik politics, economics, and social life. The power sharing agreement 
that helped bring an end to the civil war is loosely practiced today, but the top political 
positions are dominated by those from Sughd and Khatlon—civil war allies. Since 
winning the presidential election in 2013, Rahmon appointed members from Khatlon to 
key position including the Committee for National Security, Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, Finance, Economic Development and Trade, Education, and the First 
Deputy Prime Minister.241 Members from the northern Sughd Province occupy the 
positions of Prime Minister, Ministry of Industry and New Technologies, and speaker of 
the lower house of parliament.242 Members from the RRS and GBAO were appointed to 
positions of lesser influence and in smaller quantities. The practice of over representation 
of the Sughd and Khatlon sects and under representation of those from GBAO and RRS 
is similar to the political environment prior to the civil war.  
Additionally, competition for dominance of the drug trade between the “narco-
barons” in GBAO and criminal groups with links to high places in Dushanbe has created 
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additional tension.243 Many may be frustrated with the current state of affairs, but the 
stability that has occurred during the Rahmon regime, compared to the devastating civil 
war, is better than the uncertainty of change. However, this could change because 53 
percent of the Tajik population is under the age of 24, and 33 percent are under the age of 
14.244 In other words, the majority of the population was not born during the civil war 
and do not have direct memories of its destructiveness; they, therefore, may be more 
likely to take up arms to fight for greater political, economic and even religious gains. 
The operational capabilities of the Tajik military are poor primarily because the 
military lacks any systematic process for coordinating its forces and views other security 
forces as rivals rather than allies.245 Additionally, the military receives less financial 
support than the border guards, possibly because of the integration of former United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO) forces and questions of their loyalty.246 This could explain the way in 
which the Tajik military handled two significant confrontations since 2010. The first 
occurred in the Rasht district of the RRS Province after an August 2010 jail break in 
Dushanbe released 25 men. The operation lasted several months and resulted in 24 of the 
25 escapees either being killed or captured, dozens of militants killed, and over 40 people 
from various security services killed.247 The second occurred after General Abdullo 
Nazarov—National Security Chief for GBAO—was killed in GBAO on July 21, 2012. 
The fighting lasted several days and involved over 3,000 security personnel, resulting in 
the official acknowledgement of 17 security personnel killed, 23 wounded, 30 
“criminals” killed, 41 arrested, and one civilian casualty.248 Both operations were 
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technically successful, but they should have been due to the employment of large 
numbers of security forces and the capability of the militants to defend against security 
forces. In both operations, former warlords and opposition leaders from the civil war that 
still held considerable influence were either killed or arrested. For example, the 2012 
operation in GBAO resulted in the regional Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) leader being 
arrested and later mysteriously found dead.249 
Tajik border guards play a key role in protecting the Tajik borders, but these 
7,000 to 8,000 border guards are woefully underequipped and trained. The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states, 
Border guards can be divided into two groups—the young, low-paid ($2 
per month) and poorly trained conscripts and the officers who are on the 
whole better paid ($200–$400 at mid-rank) and crucially better trained.250  
In 2011, seizures by the border guards and customs officials decreased 
significantly, but the border guards still seized over twice the amount narcotics as 
customs officials.251 This could be an indication that the majority of the porous border 
with Afghanistan is being utilized to traffic narcotics and not just the Nizhny-Panj bridge 
that serves as the main crossing point between the two countries.  
The Tajik political environment is stable for the time being despite the 
government’s weak control and influence in areas such as the Rasht Valley, GBAO, and 
the Ferghana Valley. The Tajik government’s attempts to regulate religion, targeting of 
influential opposition leaders and use of repressive measures have aided in security for 
the short term. However, continued poor economic conditions in conjunction with a surge 
in drug trafficking and regional discrimination have increased the domestic security risks 
and an increase of Islamic militancy is possible. The Tajik government’s insistence on 
constructing large hydro power plants may be in the country’s best interest, but it 
complicates relations with neighbors such as Uzbekistan. 
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Uzbekistan’s political stability will be at least partially dependent on identifying a 
legitimate and competent successor to the current president. Islam Karimov has been the 
leader of Uzbekistan since 1989 and is the oldest political leader in Central Asia (born in 
1938); he is rumored to be in ill-health.252 It is speculated that Uzbekistan might follow 
Turkmenistan’s course after the death of President Niyazov and ignore constitutional 
provisions on succession and allow the elite clans to settle on a successor.253 Eventually, 
Karimov’s reign will come to an end either by his own decision or because he died in 
office. If Karimov does not appoint a successor, then a peaceful transition will depend on 
the clans and interest groups reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement. 
The Uzbek economy has continued to perform better than Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan with a 2013 estimated GDP over $55 billion. However, this figure is relative 
and, as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) states, “The Uzbek government’s 
economic data are untrustworthy, so that the true state of the economy is hard to 
ascertain.”254 The GDP figure is also relative because even if the GDP is correct, it would 
be significantly greater than that of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but Uzbekistan has a 
population (28,929,716) three-and-half times greater than Tajikistan and over five times 
greater than Kyrgyzstan.255 An area of analysis that could be indicative of the 
untrustworthiness is the discrepancy on remittance. The Uzbek government claimed that 
migrant workers remitted $2.3 billion in 2012, but according to the World Bank, the 2012 
remittance amount equaled $5.7 billion from Russia’s Central Bank.256  
Uzbekistan’s economy is also affected by tensions over natural resource 
competition with its upstream neighbors Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan is the 
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world’s sixth largest cotton producer and relies on irrigation from the Amu Darya River 
from Tajikistan and the Syr Darya River from Kyrgyzstan.257 “However, water in Central 
Asia is not only used for irrigated agriculture, but also for energy production.”258 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have difficulty providing electricity to their citizens in the 
winter, so they release more water to generate more electricity, but the increased water 
often floods areas of Uzbekistan and limits the water available for irrigation during the 
spring and summer.259 In response, Uzbekistan often impedes supplies traveling on its 
rail lines and leverages natural gas exports as bartering mechanisms.  
Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian countries, is fractured along geographic, 
ethnic, and intra-ethnic lines with emphasis on regional affiliation.260 There are at least 
seven primary affiliations or “clans,” but the Samarkand-Bukhara clan (Karimov’s clan) 
and Tashkent clan are the most influential.261 The Ferghana clan, despite its large 
numbers and the economic importance of the valley, has few senior minister positions, 
and clan members are not recruited for lower-level administration positions.262 It is the 
competition for power among the clans and its impact on security that is troublesome. 
The competitions for power between the three primary clans allegedly resulted in coup 
attempts, car bombings, and mass arrests and counter arrests, and only eased after the 
2005 Andijan massacre.263 
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Uzbekistan’s military remains stronger and better equipped than militaries of 
Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan because of the military infrastructure largely inherited from the 
USSR, but is struggling to modernize its equipment and training practices.264 Despite the 
slow modernization transformation, in May 2012, the National Security Council (NSC) 
assessed,  
Uzbekistan’s armed forces possess sufficient capabilities to defend the 
country from any foreign aggressor. The biggest threat, however, 
emanates from within, with the regime trying to prevent a “colorful” 
revolution from taking place.265 
Uzbekistan faces several security threats, both internal and external, but views 
radical Islam as the greatest danger to the country.266 The significance of non-state actors 
has likely been exaggerated by the Karimov regime in order to justify the use of security 
forces to repress regime opponents.267 
The oppressive measures of the Karimov regime have effectively silenced most 
open forms of dissent, but may have in the long term increased the security threats the 
government fears. Uzbekistan’s lack of economic development and dependence on 
remittance combined with a lack of regional cooperation with its neighbors, especially 
over water rights, create economic vulnerabilities that can bleed over to the social and 
political sectors, thus affecting the security situation. Karimov has masterfully and 
forcefully handled the clans, but it is unknown if a successor can handle the clans as they 
continue to compete for power.  
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In October 2011, Almazbek Atambayev won the Kyrgyz presidential election. 
The elections were peaceful, but came as a result of the April 2010 overthrow of 
president Bakiyev and new constitution in June 2010. The new constitution restructured 
power sharing among the president, prime minister, and the legislature to create a better 
balance among them.268 However, new legislative appointments and distribution of 
power appeared to resuscitate northern dominance over southern interest, intensifying 
regional tensions.269 Analyst Johan Engvall describes the new semi-parliament system 
that replaced the one family rule of former President Bakiyev as a “system of coalition-
based corruption, where the country’s major economic, political, and territorial assets are 
divided among political parties with a detrimental impact on their ability to govern the 
country.”270 The new political alignment has not eliminated political volatility, and the 
last four years have witnessed intense infighting between political groups representing 
northern and southern interests marked by shifting coalitions and new prime ministers.271  
Kyrgyzstan remains one of the poorest countries in Central Asia and, in 2013, 
foreign remittance accounted for 31 percent (est. $2 billion) of the GDP.272 Kyrgyzstan’s 
official unemployment rate is 8.7 percent with a poverty rate of 22 percent. However, the 
unemployment percentage is likely to be much higher, as the unemployment numbers are 
reduced by labor migration to Russia and other countries.273  
Kyrgyzstan’s construction of the large Karmbarata-1 hydro-electric plant has 
fueled competition of natural resources with its downstream neighbors, especially 
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Uzbekistan. The Kambarata-1 dam is planned to be one of the largest dams in the world 
with a reservoir of 3.7 million acre feet of water and a generating capacity of 1.9 
gigawatts.274 The project could allow Kyrgyzstan to meet its domestic electrical needs in 
the winter and create a surplus of electricity for exportation.275 The objections and 
responses at the state level have been mentioned earlier, but an equally contentious issue 
over water and energy can occur within states.  
The Ferghana Valley is the most hospitable area to irrigated agriculture in Central 
Asia and accounts for 45 percent of the farmable land within the Syr Darya basin.276 
However, the Ferghana Valley has a history of confrontation over access to water and 
tense inter-ethnic relations, with a majority of the conflicts occurring between upstream 
and downstream users due to the gravity fed irrigation systems.277 The Ferghana Valley 
and irrigated agriculture serves as a source of livelihood and backbone of the economies 
of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and of Kyrgyzstan.278 
Organized crime and drug trafficking are deeply intertwined in Kyrgyz politics, 
society, and economy. The UNODC estimates that there are 40 organized crime groups, 
while the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FDCS) estimates there are 70 organized 
crime groups throughout the country that engage in activities from racketeering, 
embezzling state assets, and drug trafficking.279 The crime groups have won seats in 
parliament and posts in other government bodies, with the main power brokers being 
ethnic Kyrgyz based in Osh and Bishkek who control 80 percent of the criminal 
markets.280 Ethnic Kyrgyz criminal groups inflamed the 2010 inter-ethnic conflict in 
Osh, more so than ethnic Uzbek criminal groups.281 The 2010 contest for dominance 
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between criminal groups demonstrates how criminal elements can impact the economy, 
political institutions, and the security threat that can develop when their fighting 
destabilizes large areas. 
Four years have passed since the inter-ethnic violence that occurred in southern 
Kyrgyzstan claimed the lives of over 400 people and displaced another 400,000. Yet, the 
underlying issues of the conflict, such as poverty and unemployment, unequal 
distribution of wealth, poor political representation of minorities, corruption, organized 
crime, and unequal distribution of justice remain.282 In 2011, Atambayev received many 
Uzbek votes for his campaign slogan of “Kyrgyzstan is for all,” and in April 2013, 
Atambayev convened a “Concept on strengthening national unity and inter-ethnic 
relations in the Kyrgyz Republic,” but few concrete gains have been observed.283  
The Kyrgyz security forces consist of 7,000 army, 2,400 air force, 5,000 border 
guard, 3,500 police, and 1,000 National Guard troops.284 The majority of troops are 
ethnic Kyrgyz conscripts with the higher command dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz although 
there are some Russian officers. Females comprise one-third of the military.285 The 
armed forces are relatively weak; they contain gaps in command and control, training, 
and discipline.286 Currently, the armed forces suffer issues with professionalization as 
conscripts account for over 70 percent of the army personnel, including 90 percent in 
units located in the more unstable southern provinces.287 The armed forces maintain a 
Soviet era structure and are assessed as unable to conduct effective counter-insurgency 
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(COIN) or counter-terrorism operations.288 The violent events that occurred in Bishkek 
and Osh in 2010 demonstrated that the military is not able to carry out COIN or violent 
containment operations, but also that the military may have been directly or indirectly 
complicit in the violence.289 These events also demonstrated the northern government’s 
inability to control the monopoly of force and impose its will on southern leaders. 
The new Kyrgyz political institution appears more democratic with greater checks 
and balances between the bodies of government, but its authority has become weaker due 
to competing personal and regional interests. Criminal organizations have grown stronger 
and more influential as the government’s influence and control have weakened. 
Organized crime groups have been able to exploit the country’s poor economic 
conditions, ethnic tensions, and security forces’ short comings to create political and 
economic conditions that are favorable for their operations.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Afghan society, government, and security forces continue to mature into forces 
capable of combatting violent extremist organizations, but they cannot yet do it on their 
own. The government needs security assistance and finances to pay their forces in order 
to address the current security threats while buying time to set conditions for long term, 
sustainable economic infrastructure development. The country has the potential for 
economic self-sufficiency, but currently requires economic assistance from the 
international community. Economics, more than ideology, ethnicity, or religion, will 
likely determine Afghanistan’s long-term stability.  
The Central Asian states outlined in this chapter, like Afghanistan, face several 
challenges to state stability. Their governments are authoritative and their over reactions 
to incidents of violence will likely provide opposition elements with increased anti- 
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government sentiment. Additionally, the Central Asian governments’ unwillingness for 
regional cooperation hampers economic development and countering narcotics trafficking 
and violent extremists.  
The next chapter will build on these points to compare potential lessons learned 
from the effects of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and its collapse in 1991to 
possible problems that could lead to state collapse in Afghanistan and Central Asia after 
the U.S. and NATO drawdown in 2014. 
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V. AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 2014: 
APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOVIET WITHDRAWAL 
This thesis has hypothesized that valuable lessons can be drawn from analyzing 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991—
which ended financial support to the region and caused political, economic, social and 
security problems in Central Asia—to the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan 
in 2014, including possible pitfalls to avoid in the region. To that end, this chapter begins 
by summarizing key actions taken by the Soviet Union from the 1989–1992 period of 
transformation. An analysis will then be applied to what is likely to happen to the region 
once coalition forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and recommendations will be made as 
to what the United States can do to assist and maintain influence in the region during the 
transition period. Finally, this chapter will discuss the importance of the United States 
maintaining a persistent presence in the region and the consequences of disengaging from 
the region entirely. 
A. AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA: 1989–1992, KEY POINTS  
Summarizing Chapter II, the lessons learned from the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1989 and its collapse in 1991 include the following: 
Politically, the Soviet Union helped install a government that was sympathetic to 
its interests prior to withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989. This government, despite 
being disjointed and unpopular, was able to stay in power after Soviet military forces 
withdrew. However, the ethnic rivalries and the persistence of mujahedeen leaders 
proved too much for the weak government when economic and military assistance ended, 
following the Soviet collapse in 1991. The government quickly disintegrated in 1992, and 
the country fell into years of civil war before the Taliban began to consolidate power in 
1994. Despite their oppressive tactics and brutal application of Sharia law, the population 
initially welcomed the Taliban because they were able to bring a measure of stability to 
the country. In other words, the Afghan government persisted as long as there was 
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financial and military aid to back it. The collapse of the central government dragged the 
country into civil war and created the conditions for a brutal regime to assume power. 
Economically, all sectors of Afghan society were dependent on massive amounts 
of economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Following the war, the country was 
unable to develop a self-sufficient or sustainable economy, and when Soviet aid ceased, 
the economy collapsed. Agriculture quickly became consumed by poppy cultivation, 
which gave rise to warlords and regional tensions surrounding narcotics trafficking. 
Industrial infrastructure was virtually non-existent, and harvesting natural resources such 
as oil and gas ceased. Harvesting and trafficking poppy became one of the only viable 
means of economic livelihood. Taliban attempts at suppressing opium production proved 
to be unpopular with the local population. Afghanistan, in other words, was dependent on 
Soviet aid and did not create a viable economy. The collapse of the economy and rise of 
narco-trafficking gave rise to warlords and regional tensions. 
Socially, the Soviet Union’s attempt at creating a national reconciliation policy 
helped stabilize the country in the short term through power-sharing schemes between 
tribal and ethnic factions. However, ethnic tensions and divisions exploded when 
financial assistance from the Soviet Union ceased when the USSR dissolved. Pashtun 
political dominance and perceived political exclusion of other groups, coupled with and 
economic inequality based on region and ethnic group, also helped drive the country into 
civil war. The rise of the Taliban, who were ethnically Pashtun, also fueled perceptions 
that Afghanistan was unable to provide equal treatment for its different ethnic groups. 
The Soviets, in other words, did not manage to shore up ethnic differences in the country, 
and these differences became violent when political and economic conditions worsened.  
In terms of security, Afghan security forces proved to be a competent force 
capable of handling domestic security concerns on its own after the Soviets withdrew. 
The Soviets continued to provide significant economic and material assistance to Afghan 
security forces following the Soviets’ departure in 1989. Simultaneously, Soviet efforts to 
buy off militias as a means of reducing fighting against the government were also 
successful. However, when Soviet economic assistance stopped, the military no longer 
had fuel for its jets and could not pay its security forces or the militias. These economic 
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shortcomings, combined with increased ethnic and tribal tensions, caused many soldiers 
and militias to defect and contributed to the deteriorated security conditions in the 
country in 1992. In other words, Afghan security forces had a measure of competence, 
but the country’s many other problems prevented them from being effective. 
Afghanistan was not the only country deeply affected by the withdrawal and 
collapse of the Soviet Union; Central Asia was also transformed. New independent 
countries developed almost overnight and were not prepared to create their own viable 
states. This thesis looked at three of the five Central Asian states—Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—to better understand what Soviet withdrawal and the 
deterioration of stability in Afghanistan did to these states.  The following lessons from 
Chapter III include: 
Politically, these Central Asian governments were inexperienced and resorted to 
the form of governance with which they were familiar, the Soviet model. However, the 
Soviet model did not provide the tools and resources of state building that these newly 
independent states required. Furthermore, these newly formed governments were weak 
and unfamiliar with developing regional cooperation with their neighbors on issues 
ranging from security—particularly in the Ferghana Valley—to sharing natural resources, 
such as water. Under these conditions, these Central Asian states resorted to heavy 
handed governments that were primarily focused on regime survival and saw any 
opposition as a threat that needed to be confronted through military crackdowns and 
imprisonment, effectively suppressing civil society and political development. 
Socially, the region experienced an identity crisis as it transitioned from being 
part of the Soviet Union to newly independent states. In some cases, new nationalist 
identities did not correspond with the multi-ethnic composition of these countries. 
Moreover, latent animosities that existed during the Soviet era became more apparent 
following Central Asia’s independence. In the Ferghana Valley, multiple clashes of 
varying intensity occurred, but the most violent were the 2005 Uzbek government 




and regional tensions became especially bad in Tajikistan and, coupled with weak 
governance and lack of security forces, the country quickly descended into civil war in 
1992.  
Economically, Central Asia was one of the poorest regions in the Soviet Union 
and declined further with its collapse. The Soviet Union planned the region’s economy 
and routed its industry through Moscow. Furthermore the region depended on Soviet 
guidance and subsidies to survive. This system collapsed virtually overnight when the 
Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991. The poor economic conditions that followed 
independence amplified ethnic, regional and other grievances. The rise of narco-
trafficking in Afghanistan also affected these countries, particularly Tajikistan, where the 
majority of narcotics were trafficked before moving on to China, Russia and Europe. 
Security in the region was also deeply affected by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets continued to enforce security and stability in Central Asia after their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1991. Security conditions in Central Asia did not 
deteriorate until the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the newly independent Central 
Asian countries to provide and enforce security on their own. Some states did better than 
others. Uzbekistan inherited Soviet security forces, including men and materiel, 
following the Soviet collapse in 1991, which contributed to stability. Tajikistan, on the 
other hand, was left with no security forces and quickly spiraled into a civil war largely 
fought by personal militias and war lords. Kyrgyzstan did not inherit much of a security 
force infrastructure, but did not experience as much turmoil as Tajikistan. 
B. AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: POSSIBLE MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
Based on the key takeaway points from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 
in 1989 and the end of its financial support of the fledgling state in 1991, the following 
are potential causes of collapse and mitigation strategies that the international community 
and United States could take: 
Politically, President Ghani’s administration faces many of the same challenges 
as the Najibullah regime did in 1991, including corruption, competing internal political 
interest, credibility issues, dependence on foreign aid, and combatting violent extremist 
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organizations. Furthermore, the United States has helped broker an ethnic power-sharing 
arrangement in Afghanistan not unlike the arrangement the Soviet Union brokered 
following its withdrawal. In 1989, despite the challenges the Afghan government faced, it 
did not collapse following the Soviets’ withdrawal, but it quickly disintegrated in 1992 
when Soviet military and financial aid ceased.  
Given this observation, it is imperative that the Afghan government continues to 
receive economic and military support from the international community; this is what 
kept the Afghan government aloft from 1989-1991 and will likely keep it viable in the 
near term. Without this support, the new Afghan government is likely to collapse, just as 
the Najibullah regime did. Furthermore, the international community, especially the 
United States, should continue to work with the government of Afghanistan to stabilize 
its power-sharing and ethnic inclusion in the government moving forward. The United 
States and the international community should hold the Afghan government accountable 
if ethnic favoritism begins to take hold, or groups or regions are excluded or favored.  
An important part of this strategy is managing the Taliban after 2014. If the 
Taliban continue to have a popular base of support, excluding them from the political 
process may alienate key power brokers and portions of society. While some members of 
the Taliban may never want a seat at the political table and will continue to fight the 
government, others within the multifaceted network have shown that they are interested 
in reconciliation and working with the government for change. It is these members of the 
Taliban that the Afghan government should reach out to and court as a means of 
reconciliation and reducing threats against the government moving forward.  
International actors should also help the government improve its reach beyond 
Kabul, and provide necessary services to show the population that the government can 
benefit the average Afghan. The United States has considerable resources that could be 
used towards this end, including USAID and the Civil Affairs branch in the U.S. military. 
However, the Afghan people must direct these efforts of extending the reach of the 
government beyond Kabul. Over a decade of United States and international development 
in the country has had mixed results because the population has not been included 
sufficiently in the process. 
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Economically, Afghanistan is also in a similar position to that following the 
Soviet withdrawal in 1989. As then, Afghanistan is utterly dependent on foreign 
assistance; by some estimates, foreign assistance is at least 90 percent of their GDP, as 
described in Chapter IV. The Soviets continued to bankroll Afghanistan’s economy 
following their withdrawal in 1989, but did little to actually develop their economy. 
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, economic assistance ceased and the economy 
collapsed.  
Given this observation, the international community should continue to provide 
economic assistance to Afghanistan, but it should be coupled with development of 
Afghanistan’s economy. Afghanistan has the natural resources and potential to develop a 
sustainable and self-sufficient economy. As described in Chapter IV, Afghanistan is rich 
in untapped mineral reserves, such as chromium, iron ore, copper, and rare earth elements 
such as uranium. Furthermore, it is estimated that Afghanistan also has untapped oil and 
gas reserves. These resources alone, if properly developed, could help create a more 
viable economy in Afghanistan.  
Current security and stability concerns prevent many foreign investors from 
investing financial capital to develop these industries. Until security conditions improve, 
foreign investors are unlikely to invest large sums of money into developing these 
underutilized aspects of Afghanistan’s economy. China is investing in Afghanistan’s 
infrastructure with the goal of tapping into its natural resources. It is unclear if China will 
actually partner with Afghanistan and help develop its economy and infrastructure, or if it 
will just extract these resources and leave Afghanistan impoverished. 
Growing and trafficking narcotics will likely remain a viable form of livelihood 
until the economy is better developed and worthwhile alternatives to the drug trade are 
established. Attempts to eradicate narcotic production, under the Taliban, resulted in loss 
of popular support and caused many to fight against those Taliban officials responsible. 
Therefore, attacking poppy production without a viable economic alternative is likely to 
backfire. Continued narcotics production is, therefore, foreseeable into the future, and its 
production will affect neighboring states, particularly Tajikistan, which will be discussed 
below.  
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Socially, the Soviets attempted to mitigate ethnic and regional tensions in 
Afghanistan by creating power-sharing arrangements in the government and developing 
an ethnically diverse military, as described in Chapter II. These arrangements were only 
viable as long as the Soviets bankrolled both the government and provided salaries for 
security forces; when the funds dried up, the small measure of ethnic cooperation the 
Soviets created quickly fell apart.  
Today, tensions and inequalities based on ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and gender 
still persist. However, the last decade have seen some improvements in civil society 
building, as described in Chapter IV; many segments of the population are better 
educated, more modernized, and have access to basic resources. As a result, if the country 
falls into chaos, the population has more to lose than it did in 1991. 
The international community, including particularly non-governmental 
organizations, should continue to work with different segments of civil society to 
reinforce and build gains made over the past decade, including opportunities for civil 
society building that promote cross-cutting ethnic cleavages in society. Coupled with 
increased pressure for power-sharing in the government and ethnic representation in 
security forces, these are prolonged engagement strategies that could work to mitigate 
ethnic and gender differences in the country.  
Militarily, Afghan security forces were sufficiently trained and well equipped 
under Soviet sponsorship; they persisted and managed to keep security in the country 
following Soviet troops’ withdrawal in 1989. However, as with other sectors in 
Afghanistan, the security forces collapsed when the infusions of Soviet money ended 
1992.  
NATO and U.S. forces have spent considerable time and money training and 
equipping Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan 
National Police, and Afghan Local Police. There is reason to question the viability of 
these forces. U.S. efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces have resulted in the 
wholesale collapse of troops in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s 
advances into Iraq in 2014. However, as the Soviet era suggests, the continuation of 
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financial support and training may strengthen these forces and make them more capable; 
the United States did not continue training and advising Iraqi forces after the U.S. 
withdrawal in 2011.  
Furthermore, Afghanistan will likely see some resistance fighters lay down their 
arms as U.S. and NATO forces withdraw—as they did when the Soviets withdrew in 
1989—but increased levels of violence are likely for the next few years, particularly if 
contests for power occur in different areas of the country. Provided that the international 
community does not cease economic and military assistance, it is likely the security 
forces will prove capable of independently defending Afghanistan against domestic 
threats. Continued international economic assistance will allow the security forces to 
operate, while providing the Afghan government the time it needs to strengthen its 
institutions, develop its economy and further stabilize. 
In sum, the international community, and the United States in particular, should 
continue providing financial assistance to all sectors of the Afghan state. This money 
should be used not only to buy time, as the Soviets did, but also to develop self-
sustainability in Afghanistan’s economy, to further develop Afghan civil society, to 
continue strengthening inter-ethnic collaboration, and to improve Afghanistan’s security 
forces. Money, in other words, is not the solution in and of its self; this was the mistake 
the Soviets made. Rather, money is a tool that can be used to buy time and work towards 
the goals of stabilization in Afghanistan mentioned above. 
C. CENTRAL ASIA POST-2014: POSSIBLE MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
Based on the key takeaway points gleaned from the time of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of its support to Central Asian states, the following are 
potential causes of collapse and possible mitigation strategies that the international 
community and United States could take: 
Politically, the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
now have over 20 years of experience functioning as independent countries; however, 
many of the lessons learned have been neither progressive nor productive. Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan have taken considerable measures aimed at ensuring regime survival, 
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while Kyrgyzstan, which is more democratic, has attempted to balance out the central 
government, reducing its ability to govern effectively. The political landscapes for 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan vary, but their shared inability or unwillingness 
to address the underlying causes of conflict adds to their political uncertainty.  
These countries will likely continue to practice measures aimed at ensuring 
regime survival, including overreaction to any opposition movement and a heavy-handed 
use of force to tamp down incidents of violence among the population. Disproportionate 
responses to acts of violence will probably generate additional anti-government 
sentiment. This trend is particularly likely for these governments’ reactions to Islamic 
movements. Currently Tajikistan is the only country that allows an Islamically based 
political party to run in elections—the Islamic Renaissance Party—but, despite this, 
Tajikistan continues to monitor and oppress any group that it sees as a political threat, 
citing Islamic terrorism as a cause. Transnational organizations like Hisbul-i-Tahrir have 
been banned in all Central Asian states. These reactions are likely to increase anti-
government sentiment and could likely fuel an insurgency down the road.  
In terms of succession, each of these countries faces challenges with handing 
power over while also maintaining a tight grip on the population and managing the 
political, regional, and business elites. Tajikistan held elections in 2013, in which it 
reelected President Rahmon to another seven year term. In Tajikistan, the issue of 
succession is complicated because Rahmon could amend the constitution—as he has 
done previously—to allow him to run again, but also because Rahmon has used various 
techniques to quash any potential political rival from becoming a viable popular 
opponent. In Uzbekistan, the uncertainty of presidential succession resembles Tajikistan, 
but with two additional elements. Uzbekistan’s leader of 25 years, Karimov, is 76 years 
old and rumored to be in poor health, but there have been no official plans for a successor 
despite scheduled elections in March 2015. In comparison, Kyrgyzstan does not share the 
same issues of succession as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan due to its more democratic 
electoral process, but Kyrgyzstan’s political future remains uncertain.  
The international community and the United States face limited options for 
encouraging more democratic practices in these countries while maintaining their 
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stability. It is unlikely that the current regimes, with perhaps the exception of Kyrgyzstan, 
will moderate and adopt more democratic practices in the near future; regime survival 
remains their priority at almost any cost. Perhaps one option for encouraging democratic 
transition over the long haul is to support small efforts aimed at civil society building. 
This approach also faces challenges because it could be construed as a threat to regime 
stability. In promoting democracy and human rights, the goals could range from 
increased levels of political representation for certain ethnicities or regions to an increase 
of citizen’s rights. This would allow the international community the ability to provide 
smaller amounts of assistance with the promise of larger assistance, while not 
condemning the authoritative Central Asian governments. In other words, small efforts at 
civil society building could help plant the seeds of democracy. Increased education could 
also help with democratic transition over the long haul. Literacy rates are high in these 
states, thanks to the Soviet Union, but much ground can be gained in the way of 
developing education systems that teach world history, philosophy and critical thinking 
skills, all of which could aid in fostering democratic ideals. Ultimately, any democratic 
transition is unlikely in the near term.  
Economically, Central Asia has high levels of poverty and unemployment and 
faces considerable economic challenges. Corruption continues to be a huge problem that 
goes hand-in hand with these countries’ undemocratic practices. Corruption is unlikely to 
wane as long as the political dynamics in each country remain unchallenged.  
These states also suffer from a lack of regional cooperation, particularly over 
trade and the sharing of natural resources such as water. This lack of cooperation affects 
economic growth, including the potential for shared hydro-electric power and crop 
irrigation, in addition to better trade agreements that would benefit all in the region. 
Sharing water has proven to be a significant challenge and may end up being a source of 
conflict between states in the near future.  
Trafficking of narcotics is another problem that affects both security and the 
economies of these countries. The lucrativeness of the drug trade will likely persist and 
continue to degrade security conditions, as well as forms of the legitimate economy. 
Additionally, the drug trade connects the people of Central Asia to Afghanistan 
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regardless of ideology or ethnicity. This is truly a regional problem that requires more 
than domestic politics to mitigate; a new form of cooperation not yet seen in the region is 
in order. 
These countries also have high rates of working aged males traveling abroad for 
employment. Currently Tajikistan has one of the highest rates of remittances as total GDP 
in the world.290 This trend needs to be reversed in order for these countries to develop 
economically. However, this economic challenge presents a chicken-and-egg problem; 
men are needed at home to develop the economy, but they will not stay home until there 
are employment opportunities.  
However, not all of the news is bad for Central Asian economies. Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each have natural resources that could improve their 
economic profile. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have tremendous hydro-electric potential 
that, if developed, could provide a surplus of power that is able to meet their domestic 
needs and also be exported to their neighboring countries. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan both 
have access to the massive amounts of recoverable oil and gas resources of the Amu 
Darya Basin that can be used for domestic consumption and also potentially be exported. 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan all have varying amounts of minerals such as 
gold, antimony, and uranium. 
The international community and the United States can help improve the 
economy in Central Asia through several means. One possible way would be through 
encouraging private businesses to invest in the Central Asian countries. American 
businesses would not only bring needed financial capital, but would also bring advanced 
technologies. Advanced technologies would allow more efficient extraction of natural 
resources and, in addition, promote better environmental conservation methods. These 
initiatives would also build jobs. Another way to improve the Central Asian economies is 
through increased regional collaboration on trade with better cooperation of customs at 
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border crossings serving as a potential building block. Increased trade among the Central 
Asian countries could lead to improved relations between these countries and a better 
appreciation of their mutual interests. As with reducing remittances, this is another 
chicken-and-egg problem: better diplomatic relations between states would help improve 
trade, but trade could provide the impetus for better diplomacy. The international 
community and the United States could help jump start this process by facilitating 
coordination and helping to build mutually reinforcing infrastructure.  
The Central Asia-South Asia 1000 is but one program that if implemented could 
be mutually beneficial and transformative for the entire region. The CASA-1000 program 
is supported by the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
U.S. State Department, and others with the goal of facilitating clean power export 
revenues for the Central Asian countries and alleviating electrical shortages in the South 
Asian countries.291 While CASA-1000 includes Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan, the construction of these hydro-electric facilities and supporting reservoirs 
provide better water management that can be beneficial for downstream neighbors such 
as Uzbekistan. More internationally supported initiatives like this that show the region’s 
interdependence and fosters better regional cooperation could go a long way in 
developing the region diplomatically as well as economically.  
Socially, these countries face several challenges as well. First, sub-state loyalties 
based on ethnicity and regionalism persist. This is particularly true in the Ferghana 
Valley where different ethnic groups are mixed and have tensions with one other. The 
Ferghana Valley is also where Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan meet 
geographically, and a lack of coordinated security plan has allowed for tensions to boil 
over into violence on several occasions. Ethnic, religious and regional tensions will 
continue to surface if underlying grievances are not addressed. Furthermore, regional, 
ethnic, religious, and tribal stresses will likely become intertwined with increased 
competition for access to natural resources, minimal political representation, economic 
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inequalities, and each respective government’s increased use of repressive measures. 
These ethnic tensions are best addressed through gradual reforms in the political 
process—which, as mentioned, are unlikely in the near future—and small efforts aimed at 
civil society building. Economic efforts aimed at sharing scarce resources could also 
reduce these social tensions. As with political transformation, addressing ethnic tensions 
in the Ferghana Valley has no easy solutions.  
Alongside ethnic tensions, another social concern in the region is disease. 
Currently, Tajikistan has the highest infection rates for tuberculosis per capita in the 
world; an infectious disease that affects economic performance through the loss of a 
working force. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also exhibit significant cases of tuberculosis, 
while all three countries have recently recorded new HIV infections at a rate 14 times 
higher than in 2000, coinciding with increased injected drug use.292 These countries also 
suffer from higher than normal diseases that are both water and foodborne. These 
diseases, which are preventable with basic sanitation and education, are negatively 
affecting social well-being and economic performance.  
The international community and United States can aid social problems in Central 
Asia through several means. On the medical front, direct assistance through providing 
medical supplies and volunteer medics through NGOs and governments provides short 
term immediate assistance, but direct assistance by itself is not sustainable, nor does it 
change long term behavior. A more sustainable approach could place emphasis on 
educating medical providers to combat these diseases directly, while educating the local 
populace about disease transmission and disease prevention.  
Security-wise, Central Asia will probably experience increases of violence as 
coalition forces withdraw from Afghanistan, but the reasons for the violence will likely  
 
 
                                                 
292 “Central Asia in the Spotlight: Growing HIV Epidemic among People Who Inject Drugs,” World 
Health Organization, June 19, 2012, http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-
releases/2012/06/central-asia-in-the-spotlight-growing-hiv-epidemic-among-people-who-inject-drugs 
86 
have as much to do with competition over natural resources, illicit trafficking, and 
frustrated populaces as they will with the ambitions of violent extremist organizations 
(VEOs) in the region.  
The increased infiltrations of narcotic traffickers, in particular, are likely to pose 
security concerns. More frequent clashes between security forces and narcotic traffickers, 
as well as between competing narco-barons, will likely occur with increased drug 
trafficking. As discussed in Chapter IV, the violence that results from clashes between 
security forces and narcotic traffickers, and rivalries between drug cartels, could result in 
multiple civilian casualties and population displacement if left unchecked.  
Furthermore, the thousands of kilometers of international borders that snake 
through and around Central Asia remain a security challenge for several reasons. First, 
the rugged and mountainous geography make large portions of the borders difficult to 
reach and, therefore, hard to monitor in the absence of technological assets such as 
drones. Second, large sections of these international borders are contested, especially in 
the Ferghana Valley, which often leads to border disputes between national security 
forces, or a lack of monitoring caused by incoherent state ownership. Third, the 
insufficient number of border guards who are responsible for securing the borders are 
often poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly paid conscripts, making them largely 
ineffective. Fourth, there is a lack of synchronization among the different national 
security forces in the region, which also affects border security. Lastly, these countries’ 
governments lack a unified, coordinated effort aimed at regional border management and 
enforcement. 
Each country could benefit from U.S. military advising and training. Specifically, 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) could also aid with improving border security 
in several ways. First, USSOF could provide non-combat support both directly and 
indirectly using security assistance (SA) activities focused on countering narcotic 
trafficking. The scope of these activities range from counter narcotics training to 
personnel exchanges to joint exercises designed to build the capacity of all security 
forces, including border guards. Additionally, USSOF could teach vital life saving 
techniques through tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) and promote better 
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synchronization and planning among security forces involved with border security. 
Second, USSOF could provide non-lethal excess supplies such as cold weather clothing. 
Perhaps most importantly, USSOF could provide non-lethal low technology surveillance 
platforms. A low-tech drone could provide needed situational awareness of border areas 
while ensuring it is maintainable by host nation forces. Finally, USSOF could provide 
valuable training and advising to each country’s security forces with the aim of better 
plans for mitigating violence and operations aimed at positively engaging the population 
in order to promote stability. USSOF would need to strike a careful balance between 
providing tactics, techniques and procedures that could be used to defend against 
legitimate threats and those that could be used to suppress civil society building within 
each country’s borders. 
All of these actions would allow U.S. military personnel to “keep a foot in the 
door” while providing U.S. diplomats leverage when dealing with government officials in 
the region. These resources would also go a long way in aiding and improving security 
forces in Central Asia. 
D. THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD IT STAY OR SHOULD IT GO? 
Finally, this thesis concludes by considering the possibility of the United States 
withdrawing from the region altogether at the end of 2014. An almost complete 
economic, military, and diplomatic disengagement from the region is an option, but there 
are significant costs of not staying engaged. First, Russia and China both view the Central 
Asian region as strategically important, but for different reasons. For Russia, Central Asia 
is a security concern due to the fears that Islamic extremism could spread in the region, 
affecting both Russia’s Muslim population and drug trafficking.293 For China, there are 
security concerns that Islamic extremism could inflame its volatile Xinjiang Muslim 
populace, but Central Asia is also important in supporting China’s growing energy needs 
and enhancing economic development in China’s impoverished regions.294 As such, 
                                                 
293 Stephen Blank, Central Asia after 2014 ( Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 
23, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo44943 
294 Ibid., 86–87. 
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China and Russia have developed bilateral security agreements and provided economic 
incentives to Central Asian governments. A significantly reduced U.S. presence in the 
region would certainly be filled by Russian and China and hurt the United States’ 
credibility for future interests in the region. 
Furthermore, the credibility of the United States would suffer in the region and in 
the eyes of the international community if it were to withdraw completely at the end of 
2014. Total disengagement would support the negative propaganda that America does not 
care about its allies. It, therefore, is not in the United States’ best interests to completely 
disengage from Central Asia. Russia and China have geographic proximity, security, 
economic, and historical ties with the region that significantly enhance their influence in 
the region. America cannot and does not need to try and match China’s economic 
assistance, or Russia’s military assistance, to the region, but it does need to remain 
engaged and work towards better influence in the region. 
Second, if Central Asian governments were to continue to weaken or collapse, it 
is likely violent extremist organizations (VEOs) would seek to capitalize on the resulting 
power vacuum. Recent and past history has shown that ungoverned areas can serve as 
areas for VEOs to train, recruit, and stage domestic and international attacks. The 
Ferghana valley, in particular, will continue to be an area where ethnic and religious 
tensions are heightened, and the potential for VEOs to spring up and cause regional 
problems is very real. 
Finally, the United States can show its commitment to the region with a smaller 
military footprint that supports a “whole of government” approach as opposed to a larger 
military presence that serves a leading role. The goal for both Afghanistan and the key 
Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan should be continued 
engagement with the goal of improving the region’s ability, governing the region better, 
care for its respective populations more effectively, defend its borders from regional 
threats, reduce illicit activity such as drug trafficking, and develop the region’s economy 
in a sustainable and responsible manner.  The cost of abandoning the region will prove 
much more costly than the time, talent and treasure invested to work towards these goals. 
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